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Philosophy Final

Cognitive science dennett philosophical views dennett

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cognitive science . DENNETT Philosophical views Dennett has remarked in several places (such as "Self-portrait", in Brainchildren ) that his overall philosophical project has remained largely the same since his time at Oxford. He is primarily concerned with providing a philosophy of mind that is grounded in empirical research. In his original dissertation , Content and Consciousness , he broke up the problem of explaining the mind into the need for a theory of content and for a theory of consciousness. His approach to this project has also stayed true to this distinction. Just as Content and Consciousness has a bipartite structure, he similarly divided Brainstorms into two sections. He would later collect several essays on content in The Intentional Stance and synthesize his views on consciousness into a unified theory in Consciousness Explained . These volumes respectively form the most extensive development of his views. [6] In Consciousness Explained , Dennett's interest in the ability of evolution to explain some of the content- producing features of consciousness is already apparent, and this has since become an integral part of his program. He defends a theory known by some as Neural Darwinism . He also presents an argument against qualia ; he argues that the concept is so confused that it cannot be put to any use or understood in any non- contradictory way, and therefore does not constitute a valid refutation of physicalism . Much of Dennett's work in the 1990s has been concerned with fleshing out his previous ideas by addressing the same topics from an evolutionary standpoint, from what distinguishes human minds from animal minds ( Kinds of Minds ), to how free will is compatible with a naturalist view of the world ( Freedom Evolves ). In his 2006 book, Breaking the Spell , Dennett attempts to subject religious belief to the same treatment, explaining possible evolutionary reasons for the phenomenon of religious adherence. Yet, in Consciousness Explained , he admits "I am a sort of ' teleofunctionalist ', of course, perhaps the original teleofunctionalist'". He goes on to say, "I am ready to come out of the closet as some sort of verificationist ". In Breaking the Spell he admits to being " a bright ", and defends the term. A "qualophile" is Dennett's nickname for any philosopher who believes in the reality of qualia . [7] Role in evolutionary debate Dennett's views on evolution are identified as being strongly adaptationist , in line with the views of ethologist Richard Dawkins . In Darwin's Dangerous Idea , Dennett showed himself even more willing than Dawkins to defend adaptationism in print, devoting an entire chapter to a criticism of the views of paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould . This stems from Gould's long-running public debate with E. O. Wilson and other evolutionary biologists over human sociobiology and its descendant evolutionary psychology , which Gould and Richard Lewontin opposed, but which Dennett advocated, together with Dawkins and Steven Pinker
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cognitive science DENNETT Philosophical views Dennett has...

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