COMPUTER SCIENCE EN

# 1 are 2 l 1 values v l 1 v l 1 2 l 1 1 the 2 l 1

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1 are 2 L 1 values V L 1 0 · · · V L 1 2 L 1 1 . The 2 L 1 values at depth L 1 of the tree are likewise paired and hashed together to get 2 L 2 commitments at depth L 2. The binary tree proceeds this way until a single hash V O 0 is reached at the root of the tree. The root serves as the commitment for all 2 L values. The root value V O 0 is distributed to all potential verifiers. The 2 L leaves are certificates, binding commitments to identities. As each node may be associated with several commitments, several leaves of the tree may be reserved for each node. Corresponding to a node A with (say) n A such certificates (leaves) the CA (or KDC) provides L hashes from the Merkle hash tree to A - one from each level of the tree. Thus A will receive and store i) n A keys; ii) n A certificates; and iii) n A L values from the tree. For a network with 8 million nodes (2 23 ), where each node is assigned n = 2 9 = 512 OTS commitments, the KDC will need to create a Merkle tree with 4 billion leaves (or depth L = 32). C 0 C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 C 5 C 6 C 7 V 3 0 V 3 1 V 3 2 V 3 3 V 3 4 V 3 5 V 3 6 V 3 7 V 2 0 V 2 1 V 2 2 V 2 3 V 1 0 V 1 1 V 0 0 Fig. 1. Merkle hash tree. To authenticate any commitment, the sender appends the leaf value and L hashes. To authenticate certificate C 3 (say, a certificate A, u o , indicating that u o is an OTS commitment of A ), the source A includes (along with its OTS) the certificate C 3 , and values V 3 2 , V 2 0 and V 1 1 . Any verifier can compute V 3 3 = h ( C 3 ), V 2 1 = h ( V 3 2 , V 3 3 ), V 1 0 = h ( V 1 0 , V 1 1 ), and V 0 0 = h ( V 1 0 , V 1 1 ), and thus be satisfied that the certificate C 3 = A, u o is authentic. In the figure, circles with darker shades indicate values appended by A along with its authentication. The circles with lighter shades (and Copyright © 2010. World Scientific Publishing Company. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 2/16/2016 3:46 AM via CGC-GROUP OF COLLEGES (GHARUAN) AN: 340572 ; Beyah, Raheem, Corbett, Cherita, McNair, Janise.; Security in Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks Account: ns224671

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40 M. Ramkumar lighter outlines) represent values that are computed by any verifier using the values sent by the signer. Note that the overhead required to verify certificates - bandwidth over- head for appending L hashes and computation of L hash functions - grows logarithmically with the number of committed certificates. If the CA re- quires to authenticate a trillion (2 40 ) certificates, L = 40. 3.1.4. Per-use (PU) Hash Chains The one-to-many schemes discussed thus far enable any verifier to verify 1) the source of the message; and that 2) the message has not been modified en route. The per-use (PU) hash-chain schemes however only permit any verifier to verify that “the sender has sent at least i messages,” and provides no assurances regarding the contents of messages (the message could have been modified en route). PU schemes, which require low overhead, have some useful applications in securing routing protocols.
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• Spring '12
• Kushal Kanwar
• Public key infrastructure, ........., Public-key cryptography, Pretty Good Privacy

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