PH100 Lecture Notes

Ex touch stove → c-fiber stimulation → more

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Unformatted text preview: Ex) Touch stove → C-fiber stimulation → more neurons fire → Physical realm | Sensation of pain → annoyance → mental realm • Interactionism ◦ There is interaction between the physical and mental realm ◦ Hard to be an interactionism and a substance dualist ◦ If the two realms are so different, how do they interact? Physicalism • All that exists in the world are either physical entities or physical properties • Varieties of physicalism ◦ Behaviorism ◦ Identity Theory ◦ Functionalism 1. Behaviorism • To talk about the mind is to talk either about the way we behave or about the way we are disposed to behave. • The mind can be explained without reference to mental events or inner psychological states/processes. • The mind is its bodily manifestations. • ex) “I believe that it's raining.” I believe that its' raining if: (1) when I go out I take an umbrella; (2) I close the windows; (3) I put on a jacket; (4) I take the bus instead of walking.. • PROBLEMS WITH BEHAVIORISM ◦ A behaviorist analysis is either circular or infinite. ◦ Isn't there a distinction between the manifestation of x and x? ▪ Don't we have inner feelings or inner mental states that can occur without their behavioral manifestations? 2. Identity Theory • The mind is identical to the brain. OR: Mental processes are identical to brain processes • ex) The experience of seeing the setting sun just IS a brain process. • Problems with identity theory 1. location 2. multiple realizability: mentality can be realized by many different things 3. Functionalism • “Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part.” • ex) What makes a corkscrew a corkscrew is its function ◦ different shapes/kinds but all achieve the same function • Varieties of minds ◦ humans have mind, computers have minds, robots have minds, animals have minds September 20/25, 2012: Epiphenomenal Qualia What is consciousness? • Consciousness → polysemic (has multiple meanings) 1. “Consciousness” can be used to described a certain state of wakefulness. 2. “Consciousness” can mean a certain type of introspective awareness. 3. “Consciousness” can mean a certain discriminatory ability. 4. “Consciousness” is used to describe a certain kind of subjective experience. Phenomenal (phenomenally conscious) : mental states present subjects with certain qualitative characteristics or qualia. • The introspectively accessible phenomenal aspects of our experiences. What is it like to undergo all of these experiences and countless many other is strikingly dissimilar to anything physical – be it simple or complex, microscopic or macroscopic....
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Ex Touch stove → C-fiber stimulation → more neurons...

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