43 adapted from s teven j b rams d m arc k ilgour g

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43 Adapted from S TEVEN J. B RAMS & D. M ARC K ILGOUR , G AME T HEORY AND N ATIONAL S ECURITY 41(Basil Blackwell 1998). 44 See id. , at 43-51.
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Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International Organization 27 Table 4: A “Bully” Game Involving Asymmetric Payoffs B (deadlock player) Cyberpeace Attack Cyberpeace 2;1 1,3 A (chicken player) Attack 3,0 0,2 In this game, B’s dominant strategy is to attack. A does not have a dominant strategy, but if A understands B’s dominant strategy to attack, it can increase its payoff from 0 to 1 by playing “cyberpeace” while B attacks. If B understand’s A’s dilemma, it will simply attack. If B does not understand A’s dilemma, A may be able to convince B to compensate A for playing “cyberpeace,” as doing so increases B’s payoff from 2 to 3. This game may illustrate an asymmetric circumstance in which a global network breakdown would not harm the deadlock player much relative to the chicken player. d. Relative and Absolute Gains Where enmity overcomes all other values, we might understand states as engaging in a game where winning in relative terms vis-à-vis other states is more important than absolute gains from interaction. 45 This can be understood in standard rationalist absolute gains terms, by considering that the losses associated with falling behind—with losing— are unacceptably great. 46 This is a distinction between ordinary cybercrime and cataclysmic cyberterrorism. The U.S. can afford to accept the risk of a few billion dollars loss due to a particularly effective virus. It cannot afford to accept the risk of sabotage of its missile control system or of destruction of its financial system. e. Information Problems In any real world context, there will be serious information problems that will impede both the ability of particular states to determine an appropriate strategy, and the ability of states to join together in a cooperative arrangement. First, it will be difficult for 45 There is disagreement between institutionalists and “realists,” who claim that states’ interests in international relations are characterized by a search for relative gains, rather than absolute gains. These realists reject the possibility of cooperation where it results in relative gains to a competitor. See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains: The Problem of Cooperation under Anarchy 37 J. C ONFL . R ES . 427 (1993); Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation , 85 A M . P OL . S CI . R EV . 701 (1991). 46 Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory , 85 A M . P OL . S CI . R EV . 1303 (1991).
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Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International Organization 28 one state to know another’s preferences. Second, it will be difficult for one state to know another’s strategy, where there are multiple available strategies. This presents a problem of coordination, even where cooperation is otherwise feasible. Law may be used to help to resolve this coordination problem. Finally, as mentioned above, it could be difficult to identify the true author of any attack, making real or cyberspace retaliation difficult.
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  • Spring '12
  • Kushal Kanwar
  • global cyberterrorism

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