example, Levene sees “the same scenario . . . played out time and time again”: Whether on coastal shore, distant prairie or desert interior, both North America and Australia witnessed essentially the same native-settler dynamic: first contact in which there were tentative and strained efforts at co-existence; mounting native resistance to increasing and insupportable settler depredations; a redoubled settler determination to seize absolute territorial control; an ensuing crisis leading to a genocidal explosion; finally an aftermath in which any surviving . . . natives either retreat elsewhere or are allowed to exist as subjugated dependants on the margins of the now established and victorious white society. 88 Historian Benjamin Madley has emphasized that indigenous resistance to conquest and exploitation often led to colonial genocides against native peoples. 89 Levene has likewise noted that native resistance can create “a dynamic in which perpetrator-state violence leads to tenacious people resistance, provoking in turn a ratcheting up of the perpetrator’s response” and a genocidal consequence. 90 Dirk Moses, another leading scholar of colonial and imperial genocides, agrees: “Resistance leads to reprisals and counterinsurgency that can be genocidal when they are designed to ensure that never again would such resistance occur.” 91 Nor is the pattern limited to colonial cases. Examining the Rwandan genocide in his 2006 book The Order of Genocide , political scientist Scott Straus argued that far from a “meticulously planned” extermination, a dynamic of escalation was critical to the hardliners’ choice of genocide. The more the hardliners felt that they were losing power and the more they felt that their armed enemy was not playing by the rules, the more the hardliners radicalized. After the president [Juvénal Habyarimana] was assassinated [on April 6, 1994] and the [RPF] rebels began advancing, the hardliners let loose. They chose genocide as an extreme, vengeful, and desperate strategy to win a war that they were losing. Events and contingency mattered. 92 ■ THE QUESTION OF GENOCIDAL INTENT Most scholars and legal theorists agree that intent defines genocide. 93 A “special intent” must be shown to target members of a particular group “as such.” Leaving aside the question of what “as such” can mean when genocide always targets its victims on the basis of multiple identities (see above), what defines special intent for legal purposes? We can begin by distinguishing intent from motive . According to Gellately and Kiernan, in criminal law, including international criminal law, the specific motive is irrelevant. Prosecutors need only to prove that the criminal act was intentional, not accidental. 94 As legal scholar John Quigley notes, In prosecutions for genocide, tribunals have not required proof of a motive . . . .
- Spring '14
- Raphael Lemkin