If neither veers off coume they will crash Thoever veers is chicken Both

If neither veers off coume they will crash thoever

This preview shows page 13 - 15 out of 17 pages.

If neither veers off coume they will crash. \Thoever veers is "chicken." Both drivers prefer to avoid death, but they also want to avoid rhe "dishonor" of being "chicken." The outcome depends on what both drivers a L o I Q q) E - z Party A Party B Conservative
Image of page 13

Subscribe to view the full document.

28 Chapter 2 Models of Politics TIw ganw dworist hinself u lwrself supplies tlw numeical uahtzs n dw payoffs . If Diuer A chooses tu sn1 on coltrse atlhiuu B chooses b stsJ on cowse also, tl'rc resuh mightbe scued u -10 fu both players, who wreck tl'rcr cus. B* if Aivu A chooses b str,1 otl cowse utd Dnqter B ueus , tlwn Dieer A might get +5 (" coruage" ) Dnc)er B -5 ("dislwnu") . If Drivu A vecrs butDriver B std)s on course, tlw resulu woullbe reversed. If both veer, eachis dishonued slighth Fl) , but not u murh a wlwn one w lw odvr stayed on colrrse. DRIVER A'S CHOICES Stay on Course Veer DRIVER B'S CHOICES Stay on course Veer A: -10 B: -10 A: +5 B: -5 A: -5 B: +5 A: -1 B: -1 Game Theory: Applying the Model Game theory is frequentty applied in internationaI conflicts. We witt explore the utitity of game theory, especiatty the notion of deterrence, in Chapter 15, "Defense Policy: Strategies for Serious Games." lile witl also exolore the weak- ness of deterrence in defending against tenorism in Chapter 16, "Homeland Security: Tenorism and Nondetenabte Threats." FIGURE 2-7 A Game-Theoretic Matrix for the Game of Chicken Game theory suggests that policymakers, or "p[ayers," adjust their conduct to reflect not only their own preferences but also the tikety choices of opponents. do, and each driver must try to predict how the other will behave. This form of "brinkmanship" is common in intemational relations (see Figure 2-7). Inspection of rhe payoff matrix suggesrs that it would be better for both drivers to veer in order to minimize the possibility of a grear loss (-10). But the matrix is too simple. One or both players may place a different value on the out. comes than is suggested by the numbers. For example, one player may prefer death to dishonor in the game. Each player must try to calculate the values of the other, and neither has complete information about the values of the opponent. Moreover, bluffing or the deliberate misrepre. sentation of one's values or resources to an opponent is always a possibility. For example, a pos- sible strategy in the game of chicken is to allow your opponent to see you dr.ink heavily before the game, stumble drunkenly toward your car, and mumble something about having lived long enough in this rotten world. The effect of this communication on your opponent may increase his or her estimate of your likelihood of staying on course, and hence provide incentive for your opponent to veer and allow you to win. An important component of game theory is the notiort of dctenence, Deterrence is the effort to prevent an opponent from undertaking an action by inspiring fear of the consequences of the action.
Image of page 14
Image of page 15
  • Fall '19
  • Prof. Madya Dr. Norhayati Binti Daud

What students are saying

  • Left Quote Icon

    As a current student on this bumpy collegiate pathway, I stumbled upon Course Hero, where I can find study resources for nearly all my courses, get online help from tutors 24/7, and even share my old projects, papers, and lecture notes with other students.

    Student Picture

    Kiran Temple University Fox School of Business ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    I cannot even describe how much Course Hero helped me this summer. It’s truly become something I can always rely on and help me. In the end, I was not only able to survive summer classes, but I was able to thrive thanks to Course Hero.

    Student Picture

    Dana University of Pennsylvania ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    The ability to access any university’s resources through Course Hero proved invaluable in my case. I was behind on Tulane coursework and actually used UCLA’s materials to help me move forward and get everything together on time.

    Student Picture

    Jill Tulane University ‘16, Course Hero Intern

Ask Expert Tutors You can ask You can ask ( soon) You can ask (will expire )
Answers in as fast as 15 minutes