In 1956, Egyptian President Gamel Nasser closed the Suez Canal; Britain, Israel, and France attacked Soviet-backed Egypt to force it open. US actually opposed its own allies, fearing that they would continue acting with aggression if not stopped. With the support of the USSR as well, the UN sent in its first peacekeepers – troops used to separate warring parties. The Suez Canal Crisis was considered a huge victory for the UN. In the Congo in 1956, the UN had to send in an enforcement army to support the Western-backed central government that was threatened by Belgian intervention and a domestic secession. Troop contributors resisted the orders of the UN and refused to pay assessments. Though the UN left a unified Congo four years later, it left with scars for its partisan support, a budgetary deficit, and an unwillingness to get involved in internal conflicts. The Cold War made further military projection by the UN impossible. Sanctions were as unusable during the Cold War as military means, excepting Rhodesia and South Africa, whose racist policies set them apart as pariahs to everyone. The influence of UN peacekeepers during this time resulted from the cooperation of belligerents and the moral weight of the international community. The new characteristics of UN operations during this time were as follows: 1. Consent is imperative before operations begin 2. Peacekeeping operations need full support from the Security Council 3. Participating nations need to provide troops and accept risks 4. A clear and precise mandate is desirable 5. Force is used only in self-defense and as a last resort Robert Keohane, "A Functional Theory of International Regimes," in After Hegemony The question he is trying to answer is, "Why political market failure occurs and how international regimes can help to overcome it." The theory developed here will show that US hegemonic power was crucial to the creation of some contemporary international economic regimes, but its continued hegemony is not necessary for the regimes to continue. Because of externalities (both costs and benefits), the market of world politics is sub-optimal but by the Coase Theorem (ec1011a), bargaining among actors could lead to a Pareto optimum solution (ie efficient markets) even without central management by the government. The fact that optimum solutions do not occur in the real world could be a sign that countries suffer from a fundamental conflict of interests, rather than problem of coordination. However, the Coase theorem has 3 conditions for application: "a legal framework
establishing liability for actions, perfect information and zero transaction costs. It's clear that none of these conditions actually hold. Further the Coase theorem does not necessarily hold in situations with more than 2 players.