151.0MONTESQUIEU ON THE NATURAL PASSIONS1.1INTRODUCTIONThroughout the history of political thought there has been a general consensusthat understanding human passions is important in helping us understand what it means tobe human. However, opinions regarding the relative goodness of the passions havediverged sharply. Although in some cases their treatment of the goodness of the passionsis ambiguous (for instance, in Plato’sSymposiumwhereSocrates speaks generallypositively oferos, which he claims is the only being he genuinely knows), classicalpolitical philosophers—at least at first blush—seem to regard the passions as parts of thehuman soul that must be overcome or tamed in order for a soul to be healthy and fullyhuman. For instance, in Plato’sRepublic,Socrates succeeds in persuading Glaucon toaccept the thesis that a healthy human soul ought to be governed by reason, which is inturn aided by spiritedness (thymos) in harnessing men’s base passions.1And in Socrates’account, when vicious passions rule, the soul is ill ordered and there is a “sickness,ugliness, and weakness” to the soul.2Aristotle, although his ultimate stance too isambiguous, generally follows Plato’s lead in looking down on the passions as parts of ournature that must be subdued in order for a human soul to be healthy. For instance, in theNicomachean Ethics,Aristotle claims that “the person lacking self-restraint, knowing thatwhat he does is base, acts on account of hispassion,while the self-restrained person,1Plato,Republic,trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 441d-445e.2Plato,Republic,444d.