Pumps conduct or pump to constitute a proximate cause of her injuries \u03a0 did not

Pumps conduct or pump to constitute a proximate cause

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Pump’s conduct or pump to constitute a proximate cause of her injuries Π did not have to walk over the pipe rack (was an alternative route) If all acts and omissions charged against respondents have run their course and are complete , their negligence does not actively contribute to injuries suffered by Π Simply created a condition that attracted Π to the scene, where the Π was injured by a third parties CASE: Metts v. Griglak (Pa. 1970) HELD: Greyhound is not liable for an accident in which Π sued, claiming that Greyhound’s speeding caused a snow swirl that caused Π to lose control of her car bc a snow swirl caused by one vehicle passing another a normal hazard for winter driving which for all practical purposes was unavoidable Greyhound owed other highway travelers a duty to exercise reasonable caution and may have been negligent in speeding, but can only be liable with respect to those harms which proceeded from a risk or hazard the foreseeability of which rendered its conduct negligent Harm suffered by Π was not the result of a risk the foreseeability of which rendered Greyhound’s excessive speed negligent Dissent: People should know that high-speed passing in such conditions dangerous and may impair others’ vision C. Superseding Cause When subsequent acts of a second tortfeasor can sometimes function to block an attribution of responsibility to an earlier tortfeasor Whether a second wrongdoing can function as a superseding cause that relieves the perpetrator of a prior wrongdoing of responsibility, even though the prior wrongdoing was a but-for cause of the victim’s injury Always joint causation cases Ordinary medical malpractice committed in the course of treating injuries created by the negligence of a D a foreseeable consequence of causing bodily injury to someone, hence not a superseding cause 23
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CASE: Britton v. Wooten (Ky. 1991) Britton leased the premises of Wooten’s Pic Pac Grocery Store to Wooten, but it was destroyed by fire, which was most likely started by arsonist lighting fire to rubbish stacked in a negligent manner HELD: The act of the arsonist in setting the fire was not a superseding cause Liable for the fire since he was negligent Makes no difference whether the intervening actor is negligent, intentional, or criminal D. Palsgraf & Kinsman CASE: Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. (NY 1928) Π was injured when a man running for the train dropped a package of plainly wrapped fireworks onto the tracks, which exploded; the explosion knocked down some scales at the other end of the platform, injuring Π HELD: The railroad is not liable for the Π ’s injuries Nothing in the situation gave notice of the perilous nature of the package RR had a duty not to directly hit her (intentional tort), to reasonably protect her (negligence), rare exceptions (strict liability) The orbit of duty defined by the orbit of danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance No duty RR owed to Π
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