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Pump’s conduct or pump to constitute a proximate cause of her injuriesΠdid not have to walk over the pipe rack (was an alternative route)If all acts and omissions charged against respondents have run their courseand are complete, their negligence does not actively contribute to injuries suffered by ΠSimply created a condition that attracted Πto the scene, where the Πwas injured by a third partiesCASE: Metts v. Griglak (Pa. 1970)HELD: Greyhound is not liable for an accident in which Πsued, claiming that Greyhound’s speeding caused a snow swirl that caused Πto lose control of her car bc a snow swirl caused by one vehicle passing another a normal hazard for winter driving which for all practical purposes was unavoidableGreyhound owed other highway travelers a duty to exercise reasonable caution and may have been negligent in speeding, but can only be liable with respect to those harms which proceeded from a risk or hazard the foreseeability of which rendered its conduct negligentHarm suffered by Πwas not the result of a risk the foreseeability of which rendered Greyhound’s excessive speed negligent Dissent: People should know that high-speed passing in such conditions dangerous and may impair others’ visionC. Superseding Cause•When subsequent acts of a second tortfeasor can sometimes function to block an attribution of responsibility to an earlier tortfeasor•Whether a second wrongdoing can function as a superseding cause that relieves the perpetrator of a prior wrongdoing of responsibility, even though the prior wrongdoing was a but-for cause of the victim’s injury•Always joint causation cases•Ordinary medical malpractice committed in the course of treating injuries created by the negligence of a D a foreseeable consequence of causing bodily injury to someone, hence not a superseding cause23
CASE: Britton v. Wooten (Ky. 1991)Britton leased the premises of Wooten’s Pic Pac Grocery Store to Wooten, but it was destroyed by fire, which was most likely started by arsonist lighting fire to rubbish stacked in a negligent mannerHELD: The act of the arsonist in setting the fire was not a superseding causeLiable for the fire since he was negligentMakes no difference whether the intervening actor is negligent, intentional, or criminalD. Palsgraf & KinsmanCASE: Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. (NY 1928)Πwas injured when a man running for the train dropped a package of plainly wrapped fireworks onto the tracks, which exploded; the explosion knocked down some scales at the other end of the platform, injuring ΠHELD: The railroad is not liable for the Π’s injuriesNothing in the situation gave notice of the perilous nature of the packageRR had a duty not to directly hit her (intentional tort), to reasonably protect her (negligence), rare exceptions (strict liability)The orbit of duty defined by the orbit of danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilanceNo duty RR owed to Π