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him upon the same cause of action is true, but the effect of a judgment againstLewisohn as a precedent is not that of res judicata,and the Massachusetts court wasunder no obligation to follow the decision as a mere judicial precedent. Nor wouldassistance in the defense of the suit, because of interest in the decision as a judicialprecedent which might influence the decision in his own case, create an estoppel asto Bigelow. Stryker v. Goodnow,123 U. S. 527. Also Rumford Chemical Works v.Hygienic Chemical Co.,215 U. S. 156.Page 225 U. S. 127But it is said that, if Bigelow was not in every sense a party, he was privy to Lewisohn,who was, and that the estoppel in the adverse judgment in the suit against Lewisohnprotected Bigelow as well.But would that judgment, if it had been for the plaintiff in that case, have boundBigelow in a subsequent suit by the same plaintiff upon the same facts? If not, uponwhat principle may he claim the advantage of it as a bar to the present suit? Thecause of action was one arising ex delicto.It was several as well as joint. The right ofaction against both might have been extinguished by a settlement with one, or by ajudgment against one and satisfaction. But the claim has come in substance to this:that, although the plaintiff had a remedy against Lewisohn and Bigelow severally orjointly, a failure to recover in an action against one is a bar to his action against theother, the facts being the same, although there has been no satisfaction for the injurydone. The only basis upon which such a result can be asserted is that Bigelow wouldhave been bound by the judgment if it had been adverse to Lewisohn, and maytherefore shelter himself behind it, since it was favorable to his joint wrongdoer.It is a principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must bemutual. Railroad Co. v. National Bank,102 U. S. 14; Keokuk & W. Railroad v.Missouri,152 U. S. 301; Freeman on Judgements § 159; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence,13th ed., § 524. The mutuality of estoppel by judgment is fully recognized in both theNew York and Massachusetts decisions: Atlantic Dock Co. v. New York,53 N.Y.64; Brigham v. Fayerweather,140 Mass. 411, 415; Nelson v. Brown,144 N.Y. 384.An apparent exception to this rule of mutuality had been held to exist where theliability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of oneexonerated in a prior suit, upon the same facts when sued by thePage 225 U. S. 128same plaintiff. See Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence,158 F. 63,where the cases are collected. The unilateral character of the estoppel of anadjudication in such cases is justified by the injustice which would result in allowing arecovery against a defendant for conduct of another when that other has beenexonerated in a direct suit. The cases in which it has been enforced are cases wherethe relation between the defendants in the two suits has been that of principal andagent, master and servant, or indemnitor and indemnitee.