diplomacy. These types of interactions suggest that a U.S.-China “grand bargain” could falteron the basis of China’s distastefor U.S. hegemony.¶Even if China is willing to accept(in its view) an “invasive” U.S.military presencein the Asia-Pacific in the present, there isno mechanism to ensure that China does not default on agreements in thefuture. China’s military power projection capabilities are growing, and Chinese leaders may see fit to act in a fashion commensurate with their nation’s growing abilities. Therefore, the U.S. cannot expect a credible Chinese commitment to accept U.S. regional hegemony in exchange for control of Taiwan.¶The second condition of a U.S.-China “grand bargain” appears equally insurmountable. Charles Glaser asserts that China would promise to resolve regional land disputes through more peaceful means if the United States were to cede control of Taiwan. As is the case with acceptance of U.S. regional hegemony, this provision of the grand bargain would be difficult to enforce. China currently finds itself besieged by a litany of competing land claimsfrom Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Asian nations. Based on China’s recent aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and President Xi Jinping’s “assertive diplomacy” manifesto, one can hardly expect that China will capitulate to its smaller, weaker neighbors. Doing so would both undermine its growing reputation as a maritime powerand undercut its goal to become an established world power.¶AsChina looks to enhance its international prestige, it is hard to believe that its leaders would tolerate the land claims of competing Asian nations. Also, it takes two parties to come to an agreement, so it is not up to China alone to guarantee the peaceful resolution of land disputes. The other disputants involved would have to make the same pledge to avoid territorial conflicts. Moreover, China’s rising national power may induceits leaders to initiate unpredictable, aggressive strategies in the future.The United States cannot orchestrate a grand bargain based onpromised concessions.
Even if China says yes, it will increaseChinese aggression and fuel nationalism—they would also say no to Korea(In 2nc Taiwan)Tucker and Glaser 11- Nancy Bernkopf Tucker is Professor of History at Georgetown University and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Shealso is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the author of Strait Talk. Bonnie Glaser is a Senior Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and also a Senior Associate with the CSIS Pacific Forum (Nancy, Bonnie, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan”, 2011, )//MPA decision to jettison Taiwan, or even cut back significantly on U.S.
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