For instance Baiou and Balinski 2000 study a matching model in which every man

For instance baiou and balinski 2000 study a matching

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marriage market. For instance, Baiou and Balinski (2000) study a matching model in which every man may have several wives and every woman several husbands and Bansal et al. (2007) study stable assignments with multiple partners. However, these models are different from ours, as we consider individuals to have one partner only. 7 Zhang (2001) extends Laitner (1991) by introducing gender asymmetry. 4
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tion on outcomes related to marriage. Botticini and Siow (2003) study how parents decide to allocate their capital between their son and their daughter, and show that in a virilocal environment, dowry endogenously emerges. Their paper differs from ours in that they focus on one family and do not study a matching problem. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2008) study how parents allocate their wealth among a given number of sons and daughters through transfers of assets at the time of marriage and levels of hu- man capital. They find that children receive more when their parents are wealthier or when they have fewer siblings. They do not put any restriction on family composition and find that siblings compete for limited resources. By contrast, we show that the constraints due to being part of the same family are different when the family chooses the spouse. Vogl (2013) uses an optimal stopping model to explore how daughter com- petition affects the quality of the spouse and human capital outcomes in South Asia, where the norm is to marry the first-born before the younger children. Our model also stresses the constraint connected with same-gender siblings on the marriage mar- ket, but without restrictive assumptions on family structure and cultural norms. The impact of family composition is also studied for other social and economic outcomes such as education (Lafortune and Lee 2014), labor (Baland et al. 2016), migration (Bratti et al. 2016), or health (Black et al. 2017). However, all of these studies neglect the equilibrium effects of family structure. By contrast, we show that type of family partition deeply affects stable matchings. Some papers compare the effects of parental consent versus individual consent on the marriage market. Edlund and Lagerlöf (2006) argue that a shift from parental to individual consent redistributes resources from old to young and from men to women. They show with an overlapping-generation model that such redistribution may have further consequences on growth. Huang et al. (2012) use data on urban couples in China in the early 1990s and find that parental matchmaking may distort children’s spouse choice, parents being more willing to substitute money for love 8 . In this case, the parents’ preferences differ from those of the children, and should be modeled 8 Hortaçsu (2007) uses data on the urban Turkish family and finds that in comparison to family- initiated marriages, couple-initiated marriages are more emotionally involving.
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  • Spring '10
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  • J2, family dimension

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