Distinction: “observable” versus “verifiable”.
–
Observable: something the contracting parties see
–
Verifiable: something that the
courts
also see

19
What is the optimal organizational form?
•
Choice #1: Stores are owned by McDonalds
–
Manager is an employee with incentives governed
by monitoring / internal career concerns
•
Choice #2: Stores are independently owned and
relationship with McDonalds governed by franchise
contract
–
Many items will be left out of the contract and will be
either left up to the manager or negotiated
ex post
as they arise
•
Notice: either way, the economies of scope from
McDonalds’ brand, menu, etc., are realized.

20
What is the optimal organizational form?
•
Fundamental tradeoff:
–
Independent franchisee will have stronger incentives
to maximize the store’s
profit
–
Weaker incentives to maximize McDonalds’
profit

21
Incentives under independence
•
Manager has strong incentives to maximize the
profit of her store
–
Exert more effort
–
Respond quickly and optimally to local demand
conditions
–
Steal market share from neighboring locations
•
Manager has weak incentives to take actions which
benefit McDonalds as a whole
–
Introducing salads that are important to image but
not popular locally
–
Changing signs / redesigning store
–
Promoting McDonalds’ brand in a city
–
Cooperate with neighboring locations

22
Incentives under independence
•
When unforeseen contingencies arise, they will
have to be negotiated
–
Haggling cost
–
Possibility that negotiations break down and
profitable investments are not made

23
Incentives under ownership
•
Manager has weaker incentives to maximize the
profit of her store
–
Effort is difficult to monitor
–
Compensation cannot be tied perfectly to store
profits
•
Manager will therefore be comparatively more
willing to invest in things that benefit the whole
company
–
More willing to trade off own store’s profits
–
May have incentives tied to the success of the
company overall
–
Headquarters can make some decisions directly
(new signs, new product offerings)

24
Incentives under ownership
•
Headquarters may be able to make key decisions
cheaply without haggling costs
•
On the other hand, there may be additional costs of
bureaucracy
–
Internal “rent seeking”
–
General organizational costs and red tape

25
The flip side
•
The same incentive problem also applies in
reverse...
•
If stores are franchises, McDonalds will have
limited incentive to make investments that increase
individual store profits
–
Marketing, training for employees, etc.
•
If stores are owned by McDonalds, its incentives
will be stronger

26

Relationship-
Specific
Investments and
“Hold Up”
27

28
Relationship-specific investments
•
A relationship-specific investment
is an action that:
–
Is costly
–
Increases the total value created in a relationship
–
Has less value if the relationship breaks down

29
Example: Coal plant
•
Imagine the white board is the great plains
•
There’s a coal mine on the left of the board,


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