On the more realistic side attempts to relaunch

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On the more realistic side, attempts to relaunch “globalization as we know it” may struggle in the face of entrenched skepticism over its benefits and the reality that demographics, indebtedness and to a large degree productivity weaknesses are likely to persist and hold down the trend rate of growth internationally. Accepting the “road to multipolarity” is a more realistic perspective, in our view, and certainly a scenario that is preferable to an “end of globaliza- tion” outcome. However, multipolarity, especially in its adolescent phase, is prone to policy errors, rival- ries and geopolitical tensions. It may be better to attempt to establish a set of rules and appropriate institutions now, so as to frame multipolar stability. This initiative could take several forms – for instance, an international cyber security agreement that follows the nuclear arms control agreements of the 1980s, or where migration becomes more intra-regional and more restrictive between large “poles.” Figure 10 The ten hottest years Ranked by anomalies (degrees Celsius) Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Credit Suisse 2015 2007 2010 2005 2014 2013 1998 2002 2012 2006 10 hottest years
34 _G etting over Globalization In the absence of new global trade agreements, the major “poles” (USA, EU, Japan, India and China) could set up a trade coordination body to help minimize trade disputes and to bring countries together to cooperate on trade-based initiatives such as China’s Silk Road project. We also see several areas where poles may compete – one is in financial market deepening, where the USA may pursue the more intense dollarization of economies in the Middle East and Latin America, with the Eurozone, Japan, the UK and China all fighting to establish themselves as financial market centers. The existence of 3–4 large “poles” could be ac- companied by the creation of formal and informal coalitions between medium-sized and smaller states. For example, we may see the creation of a formal network of small open-economy developed countries (see the Credit Suisse Research Institute publication, “The Success of Small Countries,” August 2014) to exchange policy and to create a “voice” for smaller nations. Institutionally, 20th Century international institu- tions may be scaled back. The World Bank and the WTO at least may find themselves defunct in this new landscape and may need to be recast as much smaller, regionally focused institutions (i.e. the World Bank might move its base to Africa). Simi- larly, the United Nations may find that some of its activities such as health and education remain val- ued, but that its Security Council and peace-keep- ing missions are less popular and fade into disuse. Compared to the USA and China, Europe will have the greatest challenge institutionally in terms of be- ing able to present a unified policy/voice on eco- nomic, financial and diplomatic issues. A senior, heavyweight EU foreign minister will be required, backed by a credible EU defense strategy and army. In finance, Europe may push ahead with the

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