Any delay in the trial of petitioners’ case is therefore, attributable to their own action, more than to anybody else. A delay in the trial of the case, to constitute a denial of the right to speedy trial must be vexatious, capricious and oppressive. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus affords a valid excuse for any delay in the filing of the charges, the crime charged being of such a nature involving a nationwide conspiracy and a continuing one. As plausibly argued by the Solicitor General, the delay in the filing of the charges against them was not deliberate but was rendered reasonably necessary by the exigencies of martial law and by the circumstances of their case. Nepomuceno v Sec. of National Defense . Private complainant filed a motion for postponement on the ground that he has a serious eye ailment (cataract in both eyes) that needs immediate medical attention. Thus, the court granted it in which leads to the postponement of the two hearing. The reason was the absence of the private complainant to hear the certain information regarding the libelous case whom he is the publisher. Does the accused-appellant was deprived of his right to speedy trial? Answer: No. The Court is convinced that private complainant's absences at the hearings of the case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and meritorious reasons therefor. Said absences are evidently not capricious, oppressive, nor vexatious to the two accused who had waived their appearance at the trial of the case. It should be remembered that the right to a speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations, as in the instant case where it was satisfactorily proven that private complainant had to undergo eye operations, hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad. People v Gines. Gonzales pleaded “not guilty” to the charges of multiple rape. In the hearing of 01 July 1991, the prosecution presented its first witness, a brother of private complainant. On 23 March 1992, the private complainant and her counsel not having
appeared, the public prosecutor requested a postponement of the hearing. Petitioner did not object to the postponement. On 30 March 1992, the public prosecutor again requested that the hearing be postponed on the same ground. This time, the defense objected and moved for the dismissal of the cases, claiming that the delay would violate petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Does the petitioner’s right to speedy trial violated? Answer: No. There is no transgression of the right to speedy trial where there has been no unreasonable delay. We recognize, and we have thus heretofore upheld, an accused’s right to speedy trial; in this instance, however, we see no transgression thereof. The appellate court itself has found, and later concluded, that “with only two (2) postponements in the same month entailing an interval of just seven (7) days, the proceedings have not been unreasonably delayed in violation of the right to speedy trial.” Looking at the
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- Fall '16
- Ulysses, Appellate court, Legal burden of proof, Trial court, Rights of the accused