Finally, our conclusion is fortified by the admonition of the Civil Codethat a conveyance should be interpreted to effect "the leasttransmission of right,"9and is there a better example of leasttransmission of rights than allowing or permitting only the use,without transfer of ownership, of the formula for Mafran sauce.The foregoing reasons support the conclusion of the Court ofAppeals10that what was actually ceded and transferred by therespondent patentee Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. in favor of thepetitioner corporation was only the use of the formula. Properlyspeaking, the Bill of Assignment vested in the petitioner corporationno title to the formula. Without basis, therefore, is the observation ofthe lower court that the respondent patentee "had been remiss inthe compliance of his contractual obligation to cede and transfer tothe defendant the formula for Mafran sauce."2. The next fundamental question for resolution is whether therespondent Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. was dismissed from his positionas chief chemist of the corporation without justifiable cause, and inviolation of paragraph 5-(a) of the Bill of Assignment which in partprovides that his appointment is "permanent in character."The petitioner submits that there is nothing in the successivememoranda issued by the corporate officers of the petitioner,marked exhibits B, B-1 and B-2, from which can be implied that therespondent patentee was being dismissed from his position as chiefchemist of the corporation. The fact, continues the petitioner, is thatat a special meeting of the board of directors of the corporation heldon October 14, 1960, when the board decided to suspendoperations of the factory for two to four months and to retain only askeletal force to avoid further losses, the two private respondentswere present, and the respondent patentee was even designated asthe acting superintendent, and assigned the mission of explaining tothe personnel of the factory why the corporation was stoppingoperations temporarily and laying off personnel. The petitionerfurther submits that exhibit B indicates that the salary of therespondent patentee would not be paid only during the time thatthe petitioner corporation was idle, and that he could draw hissalary as soon as the corporation resumed operations. The clearimport of this exhibit was allegedly entirely disregarded by therespondent Court of Appeals, which concluded that since thepetitioner resumed partial production of Mafran sauce withoutnotifying the said respondent formally, the latter had beendismissed as chief chemist, without considering that the petitionerhad to resume partial operations only to fill its pending orders, andthat the respondents were duly notified of that decision, that is, thatexhibit B-1 was addressed to Ricardo Francisco, and this was madeknown to the respondent Victoriano V. Francisco. Besides, the2
records will show that the respondent patentee had knowledge ofthe resumption of production by the corporation, but in spite of suchknowledge he did not report for work.