Bu t two SU bsequent developments ha ve exposed weak 1n Suns position First al

Bu t two su bsequent developments ha ve exposed weak

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Bu t two SU bsequent developments ha ve exposed weak 1n Sun's position First, al though a S trong market for nes SCS tech- commercial U nlx SCTVCTS has emerged tn the 1 99 0s Sun's nical desktop orientation, both ln its factories and 1n its field sales force, has kept it from being competitive. Tha t mar ket has instead to HP, \¡/I rh challenges from IBM, D EC and AT &T gone Pyramid- all displacing the earlier SUCCESSES of Sequent and w1 th Sun now here near AS visible AS one would have expected, grven its slze and strength. A t the same time AS Sun has tned expand its workstation paradigm to intercept the Fct to growth ir has been cut off by the surprlsmg price/perforÍnaflce accelera tion from Intel and Microsoft. This has created a "No Vacancy'' all b* few commercial desktops and threat' srgn on a
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D), and tech- rage software rt of its whole ra1 initiatives, rics industry cientific com- -ry), and Geo- ry of maPPing lmirablY. rg pins began iverted from a -the technical tduct category rtions were no rarket but had .ey tornado sig- hare when this market's leader' roduct categolY when l];re mar- not Apollo, that rat garnered all engths and vice , exposed weak- :ong market for )90s, Sun's tech- r and in its field That market has DEC, and AT&T' I and PYramid- d have exPected' as Sun has tried tercePt the PCt rice/PerforÍtraÍrce ,as created a "No ;ktops andthteaL- IN THE BOWLING ATLEY 43 ens indeed to invade sun's traditionally unchallengeable techni- cai domain What happened here? One way to put it is to say that once sun leapt from the bowling alley into its first tornado-the technical unix market-it abandoned its niche market approach in order to serve massive demand. so fa4 so good. When it came, howeve4 to going outside that domain, Sun tried to extend its tornado tactics to encompass the new territo- ries of commercial servers and commercial desktops. This did not work. Here'.s why. In neither case was the sun whole product complete, and in neither case was it positioned as the incumbent market leader. In the case of servers, it badly lacked legacy system integration on the product side and on the service side it lacked a sales and support capability appropriate to large commercial installa- tions. In the case of the commercial desktop, it lacked an appropriate accommodation with the legacy of Microsoft Dos and windows applications. To be sure, it worked hard on this problem, introducing its own software to emulate windows as well as supporting third parties like Insignia solutions with its soft PC product line. But the IT community in Fortune 500 companies has been too often burned in the past by emulated environments and so refused to accept these accommodations. As a result, sun is having to rethink its whole position in the marketplace and its strategy for going forward. In so doing, it needs to keep in mind the following principles for bowiing alley strategy as it seeks to penetrate market spaces that are not part of its traditional hegemony.
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