This rejection of natural time is explicit in Heidegger: by reformulating the problem of time in the horizon of Dasein , he is lead to posit that “ there is no natural-time, since all time belongs essentially to Dasein . ” 15 If all time is Dasein ’s, world time, then, has no ontological ground of its own, and must then be a derivative of Dasein’s time. Heidegger indeed posits world time as a derivative product of a “levelling off” of original - Dasein’s authentic - temporality. Importantly, Heidegger posits as inauthentic and derivative not only “natural time” as cycles and processes of change in nature, but also social, public time. The time of th e world as we know it is but a “fallen” form of time related to Dasein’s inauthentic mode of b eing predicated on “preoccupation , ” while for Heidegger, authentic and original temporality is predicated on the temporal structure that articulates Dasein’s authentic mode of being: “care” ( sorge ). Heidegger, then, does not merely derive worldly time from Dasein ’s temporality, but further articulates their relationship through an ethical stance of a fall towards inauthenticity. The problem of the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity thus looms large here. It revolves around Dasein ’s “ modes of being ”. Heidegger seeks to unveil Dasein ’s authentic mode of being, its structural – and temporal – unity and finitude, as care , as predic ated on the “resolute anticipation of death,” a mode of being which is itself temporal. Throughout the history of the West, this authentic mode of being has however been veiled by the development of inauthentic modes of being, based on an inauthentic self-understanding of Dasein as an “entity” rather than a “being -towards- death.” Indeed, 13 Ricoeur, Temps , 18-42. 14 Jameson, Valences , 499. 15 Heidegger, The Basic , 262.
what Heidegger means by “inauthentic” ranges across different problems and issues, but is rooted primarily in a mode of being of Dasein which understands itself “via intraworldly beings which it encounters” and let[s] its existence be determined primarily not by itself but by things and circumstances and by the others (…) Inauthentic denotes an understanding in which the existent Dasein does not understand itself primarily by that apprehended possibility of itself which is most peculiarly its own. 16 Modes of being can therefore be authentic or not, hence temporality as well. In the same way that Dasein’s authentic mode of being has been veiled by a fallen, someh ow heteronomous, mode of being, so has authentic time, Dasein’ s original temporality, been covered up by inauthentic time. These matters require a closer look. * H eideggerian modes of temporality are articulated on the basis of Dasein’s modes of being. Inauthentic modes of being articulate modes of temporality in inauthentic ways, 17 while “c are, ” as an authentic mode of being, art iculates the unity of temporal “ekstases” (past, present and future) in a specifically authentic way. Important to note here in order to
- Fall '19
- Martin Heidegger, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Henri Bergson