83 For example the DOJ has entered agreements with Lucent Technologies

83 for example the doj has entered agreements with

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83 For example, the DOJ has entered agreements with Lucent Technologies, Ingersoll-Rand, Akzo Nobel, York International, Chevron, Paradigm B.V., Textron, Omega Advisors, Baker Hughes, Aibel Group, Schnitzer Steel, Statoil, Monsanto, Invision and the Micrus Corporation. Shearman & Sterling LLP, supra , note 49. 84 Voluntary disclosure and the level of a company’s cooperation with the DOJ and SEC are factors that are taken into consideration under the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines when used to determine penalties under the FCPA. 85 For example, in August 2006, Millipore Corporation disclosed that it had uncovered unspecified payments and commission practices at a partially-owned Indian joint venture that may violate the FCPA; in February 2007, Johnson & Johnson disclosed that some of its foreign subsidiaries may have made improper payments in connection with the sale of medical devices in the course of marketing activities in two small-market countries; also in February 2007, Bausch & Lomb reported to the SEC that its Spanish subsidiary has possibly provided free products and other items to doctors at public hospitals in Spain. 19
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68 FCPA investigations started between 2005 and 2007 were the result of voluntary disclosures by the company to the SEC or DOJ. 86   The enactment of the SOX has served as a stimulus for corporate officials to realize that the government is serious about combating bribery and ensuring that corporations are engaging in accurate accounting methods. 87    Although executives (as well as the corporations they work for) can still face penalties under the SOX, it seems as though they would rather face an FCPA investigation on their own terms, instead of waiting for their bad acts to be discovered by the SEC or DOJ.  Further, they may face harsher and increased monetary penalties for violating the accounting and record-keeping provisions under the SOX. 88   Companies hope that by timely reporting   of potential  FCPA violations,   the DOJ  and SEC  will be  kinder  when imposing penalties and sanctions.  As such, they are more likely to expose their FCPA violations and hope that   they   can   “get   a   break”   from   the   government   after   the   DOJ   or   SEC   conducts   their investigation. 89   A company that voluntarily discloses a potential violation and continues to cooperate through the investigation is more likely to receive favorable treatment when the investigation is completed and penalties are imposed. 90   A significant number of cases brought by the DOJ are resolved through plea agreements and very few cases go to trial.  Through self- 86 See Danforth Newcomb & Phillip Urofsky, FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to the Bribery of Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 1665 PLI/Corp 367 (2008).
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