29. On our part, we are of the view that there are four alternative timelines that could be used tocompute when time began to run for purposes of the plaintiff’s claim for adverse possession. These are1964, 1970, 1971 or 1978. The year 1964 is the year of the sale agreement between the parties and inthis year the plaintiff took legal possession of the suit property. In 1970, the plaintiff constructed a houseon the suit property and put his elder brother in actual physical possession and occupation. Subsequentto this year, the plaintiff continued to have actual as well as constructive possession of the suit property.As correctly established by the trial court, in 1971, the plaintiff together with the appellant went to thelands office in Muranga and found that the property was not registered in the correct names of theappellant. In 1978, counsel for the appellant Messrs Karuga Wandai & Co. Advocates, wrote a letterdated 18thAugust 1978 to the plaintiff/respondent indicating that the appellant had changed his mind tosell the suit property.30. The evidence on record shows that in each of these years, the plaintiff/respondent was in actualand or constructive possession of the suit property; that the possession by the plaintiff was open,uninterrupted and based on a claim of right and or occupation as a bona fide purchaser for value. Fromwhichever year adverse possession is computed, as at the time of filing the Originating Summons in1991, twelve (12) years had lapsed and the plaintiff’s right and claim based on adverse possession hadarisen, accrued and vested. The record shows that the plaintiff’s possession of the suit property was necvi, nec clam and nec precario; possession by the plaintiff continued uninterrupted and without force untilhis death on 25thDecember, 2002; after his death, possession by the plaintiff continued through hisdependants and personal representative until 2011 when the appellant demolished the house that hadbeen constructed on the suit property. Our analysis and appreciation of the facts established on therecord leads us to conclude that the trial Judge did not err in finding that the 12 year period for adversepossession had been proved.31. The appellant contend that the plaintiff and his elder brother were in possession of the suit propertypursuant to consent given by the appellant and there can be no adverse possession when entry is byconsent of the registered proprietor. In Mwinyi Hamis Ali – v- Attorney General and PhilemonMwaisaka Wanaka,Civil Appeal No. 125 of 1997it was held that “adverse possession does notapply where possession is by consent and in a court of law, sympathy takes a second stand asthe Court is governed by statutes.” In Wambugu – v- Njuguna,(1983) KLR 172 at holding 4, thisCourt held:“Where the claimant is in exclusive possession of the land with leave and license of the appellantin pursuance to a valid agreement, the possession becomes adverse and time begins to run atthe time the license is determined”.