25 may 1993 31 series a no 260 a 80 religious freedom

, 25 May 1993, § 31, Series A no. 260-A).
80. Religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual thought and
conscience. This aspect of the right set out in the first paragraph of Article 9,
to hold any religious belief and to change religion or belief, is absolute and
unqualified. However, as further set out in Article 9 § 1, freedom of religion
also encompasses the freedom to manifest one’s belief, alone and in private
but also to practice in community with others and in public. The
manifestation of religious belief may take the form of worship, teaching,
practice and observance. Bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up
with the existence of religious convictions (see Kokkinakis, cited above, §
31 and also Leyla Ş ahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 105, ECHR
2005-XI). Since the manifestation by one person of his or her religious
belief may have an impact on others, the drafters of the Convention
qualified this aspect of freedom of religion in the manner set out in Article 9
§ 2. This second paragraph provides that any limitation placed on a person’s
freedom to manifest religion or belief must be prescribed by law and
necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of one or more of the legitimate
aims set out therein.
81. The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion denotes
views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and
importance (see Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, § 110, ECHR
2011; Leela Förderkreis e.V. and Others v. Germany , no. 58911/00, § 80,
6 November 2008; Jakóbski v. Poland , no. 18429/06, § 44, 7 December
2010). Provided this is satisfied, the State’s duty of neutrality and
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impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the
legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are
expressed (see Manoussakis and Others v. Greece , judgment of
26 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1365, § 47; Hasan and Chaush
v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 78, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI; Refah Partisi
(the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98,
41343/98 and 41344/98, § 1, ECHR 2003-II).
82. Even where the belief in question attains the required level of
cogency and importance, it cannot be said that every act which is in some
way inspired, motivated or influenced by it constitutes a “manifestation” of
the belief. Thus, for example, acts or omissions which do not directly
express the belief concerned or which are only remotely connected to a
precept of faith fall outside the protection of Article 9 § 1 (see Skugar and
Others v. Russia (dec.), no. 40010/04, 3 December 2009 and, for example,
Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom , Commission’s report of 12 October
1978, Decisions and Reports 19, p. 5; C. v. the United Kingdom,
Commission decision of 15 December 1983, DR 37, p. 142; Zaoui
v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 41615/98, 18 January 2001). In order to count as a
“manifestation” within the meaning of Article 9, the act in question must be
intimately linked to the religion or belief. An example would be an act of
worship or devotion which forms part of the practice of a religion or belief
in a generally recognised form. However, the manifestation of religion or
belief is not limited to such acts; the existence of a sufficiently close and
direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief must be determined
on the facts of each case. In particular, there is no requirement on the
applicant to establish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated
by the religion in question (see Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France