the extended preference ranking for the 0 lottery that is for a lln chance of 0

The extended preference ranking for the 0 lottery

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the extended preference ranking for the 0, lottery (that is, for alln chance of 0, permuted with each of the n persons in the population) asagainst the 0, lottery; (5) use this extended lottery preference as the socialwelfare function for comparing 0, to 0,.12The Harsanyi construct remains quite controversial. It is unclear thatthe construct solves the problem of rendering individual rankings ofoutcomes comparable across persons independent of an appeal to theobjective value or hedonic tone of the outcomes. Harsanyi argues thatdifferent persons will not develop different extended rankings of person-states; instead, he claims, these will all converge on a single extendedranking. But why believe that the rankings will converge-why will we allrank Ok-A, over O-A-absent some independent standard by reference towhich person-states can be ranked? To quote one critic of Harsanyi: "[Tiherelevant [extended] preference must be purged of the judge's own personaltastes, attitudes, feelings, moral views and so on. The problem is, then,how, after that sort of purging [and absent further reference to objectivecriteria], I can form any sort of... preference at all." 113112. See Harsanyi, supra note 108: see also John A. Weymark. A Reconsideration of theHarsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING.supra note 110, at 255, 289-97 (analyzing Harsanyi's construct). A less elaborate construct thanHarsanyi's is the so-called "zero-one" rule, suggested by J.R. Isbell. For each person. constructthe familiar intrapersonal cardinal index of welfare known as the von Neumann-Morgenstemindex (that is, the index that assigns numbers to outcomes such that a person's preferences overthese outcomes are tracked by the index numbers, and a person's preferences over lotteries of theoutcomes are tracked by the expected value of the index numbers for the outcomes). Make sure.additionally, that for each person the index number I is assigned to her highest outcome, and 0 isassigned to the lowest. Then, Isbell proposes, the interpersonal comparison of two outcomes. 0,and 0,, is quite simple: Determine the numerical difference between the two outcomes on eachperson's zero-one index, and aggregate. Isbell's proposal is discussed in Hammond. supra note110, at 215-16; Hausman, supra note 106, at 479-82- and Weintraub, supra note 108, at 317-18.See also I KEN BNMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRAcT PLAYING FAIR 282-96(1994) (providing an overview of interpersonal comparisons of utility).113. James Griffin, Against the Taste Model, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 110, at 45, 53-54. For a similar criticism, see Hausman. supra note 106. at 477-78. Similarly, Isbell's zero-one rule can be criticized because it relies upon information about howpersons intrapersonally rank outcomes under risk-each person's index number for 0,. or for 0,,1999]HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 207 1999-2000
The Yale Law JournalIt is beyond the scope of this Article to address the controversy over theHarsanyi construct and over other attempts to compare the degree to which

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