In x rating the tv program of the petitioner the

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the
clear and present danger rule . In American Bible Society v . City of Manila , this Court
held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.
Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of
expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs . Elizalde Rope
Workers Union , we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary
to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger .”
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the
respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify
the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against
another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground .

3. Exemption from union shop
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Roper Workers Union
FACTS :
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the “Iglesia
ni Cristo”, had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since
1958. He was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union (Union) which had with
the Company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
“Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.”
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA 3350, the employer
was not precluded “from making an agreement with a labor organization to require
as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees.” On June 18, 1961, however, RA 3350 was
enacted, introducing an amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875, as
follows: “xxx but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with
any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union. The
Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee
from the service because he was resigning from the Union as a member. The
Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could