agents of the Israeli government with the probable involvement of a person or persons working for the contractor, not a sub-national terrorist group intent on making its own weapons (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). The circumstances under which this theft occurred were unique, and there was significant information about the contractorÕs relationship to Israel that should have rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it involved a government and not a sub-national group,the theft underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials, especially because the technical requirements for making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability of success by a terrorist group, though low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two decades, there has beena significant effort to increase protection of such materials, particularly in recent years through the efforts of nongovernmental organizationslike the International Panel on Fissile Materials6 and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the materials as secure as the weapons themselves.
No Motive – 1NCTerrorists don’t want nukes and can’t get them.Weiss 2015Leonard, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, USA, and a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, On fear and nuclear terrorism, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(2) 75–87Are terrorists even interested in making their own nuclear weapons? A recent paper (Friedman and Lewis, 2014) postulates a scenario by which terrorists might seize nuclear materials in Pakistan for fashioning a weapon. While jihadist sympathizers are known to have worked within the Pakistani nuclear establishment, there is little to no evidence that terrorist groupsin or outside the region are seriously trying to obtain a nuclear capability. And Pakistan has been operating a uranium enrichment plant for its weapons program for nearly 30 years with no credible reports of diversion of HEU from the plant. There is one stark example of a terrorist organization that actually started a nuclear effort: the Aum Shinrikyogroup. At its peak, this religious cult had a membership estimated in the tens ofthousandsspread over a variety of countries, including Japan; its members had scientificexpertisein many areas; and the group was well funded. Aum Shinrikyo obtained accessto natural uranium supplies, but the nuclear weapon effort stalled and was abandoned. The group was also interested in chemical weapons and did produce sarin nerve gas with which they attacked the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 persons. Aum Shinrikyo is now a small organization under continuing close surveillance. What about highly organized groups, designated appropriately as terrorist, that have acquired enough territory to
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