Authoritarian proclivity and protracted disputes with

authoritarian proclivity and protracted disputes with its southern
neighbours over the management of Nile River resources. But perhaps
most damning, from an African perspective, is its lack of real influence in
(some would even say interest in or association with the identity of) Sub-
Saharan Africa.
South Africa’ diplomatic leadership credentials are not as entrenched
as those of Nigeria or Egypt. Nevertheless, since its transition to
democracy in the early 1990s it has assumed superior moral leadership on
the continent and in multilateral fora globally. This stature is advanced
inter alia by the country’s acclaimed democratic transition, four Nobel
peace laureates and the fact that it became the first country ever to disarm
its nuclear arsenal unilaterally. As Africa’s largest economic and military
power, its continental impact has always been guaranteed, but post-
apartheid South Africa has also quickly built up a diplomatic track-record
of promoting peace on the continent, including mediation in Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ivory Coast. In addition, it has
spearheaded unprecedented success in building Africa’s relations with the
developed world.
These three contenders are all undisputed leaders in their respective
sub-regions and their impact on African history has undeniably
transcended their own borders and immediate regions. The obvious
question arises as to which of the three would be most representative of
Africa. This issue has not been put to an AU vote, but the prospective
47
Leadership Versus Comradeship in Africa's Quest For Security Council Transformation

choice has caused bitter rivalry among the contenders and their allies.
Adebajo
xii
notes that that their respective adversaries have dismissed
Nigeria as too “anarchic”, South Africa as too “albinocratic” and Egypt as
too “Arab”. This observation draws on schismatic tensions in African unity
that simmer underneath the (façade of) consensus so exalted by African
integrationists, and belies the “common” nature of Africa’s approach to
UNSC reform.
Africa’s self-engineered crisis of multilateralism
The disunity within Africa over permanent UNSC representation begs
the question whether the Ezulwini Consensus and its precursor, the Harare
Declaration, had at any stage been vetted at any level other than that of AU
foreign ministers and heads of state/government. The dearth of input from
African civil society into formulation of the various generations of Africa’s
“Common Position”, is but one reason to consider the notion of a
consensus position premature, if not totally unrealistic.
Even at the governmental level, there has not been substantive
consensus within Africa. The Sirte Declaration in July 2005 was adopted by
majority decision, not by consensus. This means that even if the AU had
managed to merge its proposal with the G-4, it may not have received the
supporting votes of all its members if the proposal had been put to an
UNGA vote. On its own, the AU’s uncompromising approach to UNSC