¶ Borders Not Only Geographic, but Epistemic ¶ Accordingly, our first thesis is the following. ‘ Borders’ are not only geographic ¶ but also political, subjective (e.g. cultural) and epistemic and, contrary to ¶ frontiers, the very concept of ‘border’ implies the existence of people, languages, ¶ religions and knowledge on both sides linked through relations established by ¶ the coloniality of power (e.g. structured by the imperial and colonial differences). ¶ Borders in this precise sense, are not a natural outcome of a natural or divine ¶ historical processes in human history, but were created in the very constitution ¶ of the modern/colonial world (i.e. in the imaginary of Western and Atlantic ¶ capitalist empires formed in the past five hundred years). If we limit our observations ¶ to the geographic, epistemic and subjective types of borders in the ¶ modern/colonial world (from the European Renaissance till today), we will see ¶ that they all have been created from the perspective of European imperial/ ¶ colonial expansion: massive appropriation of land accompanied by the constitution ¶ of international law that justified the massive appropriation of land ¶ (Grovogui, 1996; Schmitt, 1952); control
of knowledge (the epistemology of the ¶ zero point as representation of the real) by disqualifying non-European languages ¶ and epistemologies and control of subjectivities (by conversation, civilization, ¶ democratization) or, in today’s language – by the globalization of culture.
Law The root of the creation of law that governs a nature is violence therefore law itself is violence in order to prevent violence Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of International Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322–338, Accessed: 7/27/13,) In his essay Critique of Violence (1927), Walter Benjamin considers the relationship between law and violence . More specifically, Benjamin analyzes the foundations of justifications for the use of certain forms of violence and the designation of such violence as legitimate . Indeed, it is precisely the assumed distinction between what counts as legitimate and illegitimate violence that he seeks to interrogate overall. His hypothesis is that the interest of law in having a monopoly of violence over a population within a given territory is not simply to preserve legal ends but rather to preserve the very foundational structure of the juridical – political order of the state itself . Thus, in an extended passage, Benjamin argues: For if violence, violence crowned by fate, is the origin of the law, then it may be readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life and death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of the law jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence.… For in the exercise of violence over life and death, more than in any other legal act, the law reaffirms itself. But in this very violence something rotten in the law
You've reached the end of your free preview.
Want to read all 279 pages?
- Fall '16
- Sovereignty, sovereign power