is deemed to have excepted to court “giving an instruction, refusing to give an
instruction, or modifying an instruction requested . . . .
”
(Code Civ. Proc, § 647;
Suman
v. BMW of North America, Inc.
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1, 9;
Chapman v. Enos
(2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 920, 927-928;
National Medical Transportation Network v. Deloitte &
Touche
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 412, 428.)
The
Chapman
standard applies to instructional error in commitment proceedings
where the element of the commitment standard is misstated or omitted.
(
In re Howard N.
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 137 [omit an element in juvenile commitment];
People v. Roberg
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 989 [SVP];
People v. Hurtado
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1194
[misinstruct on elements of SVP];
People v. Johnwell
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267,
1274-1278 [competency trial];
People v. Noble
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 191
[misinstruct on elements and burden of proof of MDO];
Conservatorship of Buchanan
(1978) 78 Cal.3d 241, 288. disapproved on other grounds in
Conservatorship of Early
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 255; see
People v. Mickle
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 198 (conc. opn. of
Mosk, J.) [competency]; see
People v. Medina
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 922 (dis. opn. of
Broussard, J.) [competency]; but see
People v. Marks
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 222 [error in
competency instruction that was not constitutionally based];
People v. Cossgrove
(2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1273-1276 [directed verdict in MDO trial].)
Juror misconduct in civil cases exists.
(See, e.g.,
Province v. Center for Women’s
Health & Family Birth
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1673, 1679-1680 [reversal in civil case
from juror reading newspapers and discussing it at deliberations];
Rinker v. County of
Napa
(9th Cir. 1983) 727 F.2d 1352, 1354.)
But, at most, it is a due process violation.
The state constitutional right jury trial (art. I, § 16) is broader than the federal
provision.
(See, e.g.,
People v. Nesler
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578-582 [under California
law, if proven actual juror misconduct, there is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice];
People v. Ernst
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 441, 444, 448 [waiver of right to jury requires personal
waiver by the defendant];
Tracy v. Municipal Court
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 760 [right to jury in
any misdemeanor].)
The right against the discrimination of jurors under
Wheeler
the
same as under
Batson
. (
People v. Yeoman
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117.)
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies to the states.
(
In re Winship
(1970) 397 U.S. 358, 365-367.)
It applies in delinquency cases.
(
Ibid.
)
In involuntary commitment schemes, the federal constitution requires a finding
only by clear and convincing evidence.
(
Foucha v. Louisiana
(1992) 504 U.S. 71, 86;
Addington v. Texas
(1979) 441 U.S. 418, 431-433.)
California’s requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is based on statutes and the state’s due process and equal
protection clauses.
(
Conservatorship of Roulet
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [LPS];
People
v. Thomas
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 644 [CRC];
People v. Feagley
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 338,
376 [unanimity for MDSO];
People v. Burnick
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 322 [beyond a
reasonable doubt for MDSO].)
In commitment proceedings, there can be a federal equal
protection violation to deprive certain civil commitment defendants rights the state grants
other civil commitment defendants.
(See
Jackson, supra,
406 U.S. at pp. 728-730;
Baxstrom, supra,
383 U.S. at pp. 111-114.)
