2002 it is interesting that sealand has avoided

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2002. It is interesting that Sealand has avoided reaching the very bottom, in terms, for example, of permitting child pornography, demonstrating that territorial jurisdiction over real assets and over people in places the people wish to live may still assert some discipline. 34 See Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction, 3 J. I NT L E CON . L. 331 (2000).
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Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International Organization 22 Moreover, different phases or components of the cyberterrorism security issue will have different payoff structures, and so will best be analyzed by analogy to different games. Some games will contain an efficient dominant strategy that will benefit each individual state, and therefore will have an efficient Nash equilibrium. Other games will be characterized best as coordination or assurance games, similar to the “stag hunt” parable. Still other games will be cooperation games, more like the “prisoner’s dilemma.” 35 Of course, there is also the possibility that cooperation is inefficient, resulting in a “deadlock” game in which at least one player’s dominant, and efficient, strategy is to defect. 36 Furthermore, it is likely that cyberspace security will involve asymmetric games, as cooperation will be more valuable to some players than to others. It would be possible to generate a large number of individual games within the cyberterrorism security field. There are bilateral games and multilateral games; a wide array of payoff structures, including some that are symmetric and some that are asymmetric. The problem of global cyberterrorism has a payoff structure that cannot be assessed without substantial empirical analysis. These game models are simply names for particular payoff structures. As we will see below, at least under some of these games, it may be possible for states to overcome coordination problems or cooperation problems in order to reach implicit or explicit agreements. We would only expect these agreements, if at all, under circumstances where the benefits to states as a group exceed the costs: where the agreements are Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Side payments may be necessary in order to reach Kaldor-Hicks efficient transactions. Side payments are by definition “outside” the initial game, but may be understood as part of a broader strategic context. In this paper, it is necessary to limit the scope of our analysis. Therefore, we will focus on three potential contexts, and a possible game model for each. These analyses assume that in at least a significant number of cases, private initiatives are insufficient, and government intervention is necessary, but not sufficient, to provide an efficient level of security. The three contexts are the following: The Cybersecurity Public Goods Game The Mutual Legal Assistance Game The State Sponsorship of Cyberterrorism Game under Symmetric and Asymmetric Preferences We review each of these in turn below.
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