Total Number of Resolutions City: Seoul 0 5 10 5 10 15 20 25 Figure 53: Total count of resolution activity for Bangkok, Denver, and Seoul by hour of day (China Standard Time) between 2010 and 2015. Whereas the Bangkok graph suggests collections activity, the time of day data for Denver and Seoul is consistent with parking. The majority of Denver resolutions occurs before lunch or at closing time. Seoul has a higher number of resolutions and a less pronounced ratio of resolutions versus time spent. It mimics the Denver graph except for a few early-morning resolutions. Again, we see a majority of resolutions occurring before noon and at closing time, albeit with a less extreme bias than Denver.
Copyright © 2015 | ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI) 65 C A M E R A S H Y Conclusion
Copyright © 2015 | ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI) Project CameraShy: Conclusions 66 C hina’s incremental yet determined march into the South China Sea is clearly underway. These overt efforts by multiple pillars of Chinese national power are an outward manifestation of their intent to influence and control regional interests. However, operations occurring in the shadows are equally important to what we see conventionally. All of China’s activities in the South China Sea, whether military, diplomatic, or economic, have been long supported by a well-resourced covert signals intelligence and digital exploitation unit that maintained deep access within China’s Southeast Asian neighbors’ public and private sector enterprises. China’s justification in leveraging the military grade signals intelligence Unit 78020 for these operations goes far beyond exploiting countless enterprise networks to acquire proprietary data. Unit 78020’s network intrusions are just a ways to a means, and the greensky27.vcip.net infrastructure analyzed in this report is just one small cog in the machine. What is really at hand is a broader national objective of physically intruding into the 1.4 million square miles that make up the South China Sea. It is likely that China does not view this behavior as criminal in nature, insofar as it cannot be stealing if you already consider something to be yours. But the targets of this activity most certainly do not share that view. This aggressiveness clearly comes at an expense to China’s reputation regionally and internationally as credible proof of these operations continues to mount. As this report adds its testimony to the trial, we expect – and have already seen – a temporary cessation in greensky27.vcip.net activity and broader Naikon activities. What we do not expect to see is any change in policy, rhetoric, or operations; China will undoubtedly continue their routine of blasé denials and dismissals of all allegations. Such a position becomes harder to maintain, however, when one of their own – albeit unwittingly – offers the incriminating evidence. We hope the evidences revealed in this report serve as a catalyst for greater awareness and improved diplomacy within the South China Sea region and around the globe.
- Spring '14
- IP address, South China Sea, East China Sea, Kunming, DGI