Findings agreed that the program began poorly in

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findings agreed that the program began poorly in terms of management and operations. Perspectives vary on how much the program improved over time.25In his cover letter to the CIA Comments, CIA Director Brennan stated:We agree with a number of the [SSCI] Study’s conclusions. In particular, we agree that the Agency: Was unprepared and lacked core competencies to respond effectively to the decision made in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that the Agency undertake what would be an unprecedented program of detaining and interrogating suspected Al Qa’ida and affiliated terrorists. This lack of preparation and competencies resulted in significant lapses in the Agency’s ability to develop and monitor its initial detention and interrogation activities. These initial lapses, most of which were corrected by 2003 and have been the subject of multiple internal and external investigations, were the result of a failure of management at multiple levels, albeit at a time when CIA management was stretched to the limit as the CIA led the U.S. Government’s counterterrorism response to the 9/11 attacks against the Homeland.26In 2003, George Tenet, then-DCI, provided written Interrogation Guidelinesto CIA interrogators and medical personnel.27Guidance defined “Permissible Interrogation Techniques” as both SITs and EITs unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA.28SITs were defined as those techniques in accordance with, but not limited to, all lawful forms of questioning employed by U.S. law enforcement and military interrogation personnel and not incorporating significant physical or psychological pressure.29Guidance provided by the CIA Office of Medical Services (OMS) in December 2004 approved additional techniques such as shaving, stripping, hooding, (...continued) member in U.S. custody at that time. This accelerated CIA’s development of an interrogation program.”(p 12) “The Agency then assembled a team that interrogated Abu Zubaydah using non-aggressive, non-physical elicitation techniques.… The Agency believed that Abu Zubaydah was withholding imminent threat information.”(p. 13) The CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC), with the assistance of the Office of Technical Service (OTS), proposed techniques based on the recommendations of two psychologists with experience in the USAF’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) training program (pp. 13-15). See also p. 3, paragraph 5, for background and context. 23The IG Special Review, issued in May 2004, documented the results of an investigation by the Office of the Inspector General into allegations of wrongdoing by CIA personnel in connection with counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities. A redacted version of the classified report is publicly available. Among other things, the document defines key terms, describes the early years of the program as determined by IG investigators, and provides copies of several authoritative executive branch documents. For additional information on IG Special Review, see SSCI Study, pp. 121-124 of 499. 24

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