Roberts john 1986 a signaling model of predatory

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——— . 1990. Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective, J. Labor Econ. 8:2, pp. 230 50. Welch, Ivo. 1989. Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, J. Finance 44:2, pp. 421 49. Weiss, Andrew. 1983. A Sorting-cum-learning Model of Education, J. Polit. Econ. 91:3, pp. 420 42. Wernerfelt, Birger. 1988. Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signaling by Posting a Bond, Rand J. Econ. 19:3, pp. 458 66. Williams, Joseph. 1988. Efficient Signaling with Dividends, Investment, and Stock Repur- chases, J. Finance 43:3, pp. 737 47. Wiener, Joshua L. 1985. Are Warranties Accurate Signals of Product Reliability? J. Cons. Res. 12:2, pp. 245 50. Wilson, Charles A. 1977. A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information, J. Econ. Theory 16:2, pp. 167 207. Wolpin, Kenneth I. 1977. Education and Screening, Amer. Econ. Rev. 67:5, pp. 949 58. Young, H. Peyton. 1993. The Evolution of Conventions, Econometrica 61:1, pp. 57 84.
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