A close relationship between analysts and

A close relationship between analysts and policymakers may be necessary
to overcome barriers in communication and intelligence acceptance. But, if it
becomes too close, the relationship risks politicization, which is the
manipulation of intelligence data and assessments to support policy. This
tradeoff, a fundamental issue for intelligence managers, has been the
subject of many discussions over the past fifty years. Theoretically,
obtaining both the objectivity and accuracy inherent in intelligence that is
outside the chain of command and the relevancy derived from a close
policy support should be possible.
A variety of mechanisms have been posited to close this gap while
avoiding the apparent tradeoff inherent in the dynamic. The report of the
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States
Intelligence Community (the Brown Commission) in March 1996 stated
that ‘‘Intelligence analysts may be assigned to the staffs of certain
consumers and integrated into their workforce, taking part in the
substantive work of the office, participating in foreign travel, discussion
with foreign representatives, etc.’’
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In addition, ‘‘Some consumers are
supported by detailing intelligence analysts to help with a particular issue
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PREVENTING INTELLIGENCE FAILURES
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 17, NUMBER 4

or process; for example, to support a treaty negotiation. In other cases,
intelligence producers station ‘liaisons’ with their customers, not to
provide substantive support, but to serve as a focal point for requests for
such support.’’ By such mechanisms intelligence retains autonomy and
institutional objectivity, but integrates intelligence analysis into the actual
policy process. Quoting again from the Brown Commission report: ‘‘The
Commission found that those consumers who have intelligence aides on
their staffs . . . tend to express greater satisfaction with the quality of
intelligence.’’ A more satisfied consumer indicates that more targeted
intelligence analysis was applied to more relevant policy questions than
had been the case prior to this procedural mechanism. Such attempts to
expand the relationship between intelligence and policy, to close the gap
the naturally exists between them, should help U.S. policymakers by
providing them with more accurate and relevant information to create and
implement national security policy.
IMPROVEMENTS FOR A POST^SEPTEMBER 11TH WORLD
The United States will continue to face threats to its people, wealth, and
power. The best safeguard against catastrophic surprise will be continued
vigilance against the potential for intelligence failure. This entails
recognition of the tradeoffs and pathologies that cause failure, the self-
conscious administration of rigor to identify and hopefully correct
deficiencies in analysis, and the continued efforts to better integrate
accurate intelligence into policymaking. The dual emphasis on the basic
principles of tradecraft and customer service would go far toward reducing
the frequency of both high profile and mundane intelligence failures.