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between deterrence and reassurance. When Washington decided to issue a visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, in 1995, it deassured Beijing about the US commitment to the one-China policy. Beijing responded to “creeping Taiwan independence” by launching missiles off Taiwan’s ports, prompting Washington to dispatch two aircraft carriers to the region. In the aftermath of the crisis, President Bill Clinton attempted to calm Beijing’s fearwhile visiting Shanghai in 1998 by publicly announcingthe “Three Noes” (no support of Taiwan independence; no support of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”; and no support of Taiwan’s membership in any international organization that requires statehood). But he overcorrected. As Andrew Nathan points out, this “intentional tilt toward Beijing” was counterproductive. It led President Lee to harden Taiwan’s positionby declaring that cross-Strait relations were akin to “special state-to- state relationship.” Tensions quickly escalated, with Beijing freezing all contacts with Taiwan. Nathan concludes, “The United States’ policy of reassuring Beijing has also deassured Taiwan, thus worsening rather than easing tensions.”55 Thus, accommodating China on Taiwan would have thesimilar effect of deassuring Taiwanand raising tensions. It would destroy the delicate balancebetween deterrence and reassurance. Accommodation would force Taiwan into taking risky political initiatives that could further destabilize the Taiwan Strait, as it did after President Clinton’s “three noes” announcement in 1998. The current US policy of strategic ambiguity has kept the peace in the region, and there is no sound strategic rationale to change a successful policy.
--- XT: No Solvency/Prolif Turn Arms sales preserve stability – the plan guarantees Taiwan clings to independence, increases risks of prolif, and emboldens Chinese coercion Shelley 11--- PhD in Government, Harvard (Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College in North Carolina, leading authority on Taiwan who has been studying and visiting Taiwan for nearly three decades, visiting researcher at Chengchi University in Taipei and a visitingprofessor at Fudan University in Shanghai, “Why giving up Taiwan will not help us with China,” 11-29, ) Indeed, even the best-case scenario for Beijing is unpredictable and potentially destabilizing. We can say Gilley is right, and Taiwan is moving toward Finlandization. In fact, there is ample evidence for a consensus within Taiwan that deeper engagement with mainland China is both inevitable and desirable. At the same time, however, the Taiwanese people are more attached than ever to their political autonomy and distinctive identity. Withdrawing US security assistance would not change these attitudes, but many Taiwanese people would view this action, rightly or wrongly, as a deathblow to the island’s autonomy.Some wouldtry to flee. Others would