*p<.10,**p< .05, *** p< .01Table 3:OLS Model Predicting Support for Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies.
Krueger, Best, and Johnson:Assessing DimensionsSurveillance & Society18(1)117Figure 3:Terror threat effect on support for domestic counterterrorism policy by effectiveness level.We find that for those respondents with low scores (0, 1, or 2) on the effectiveness index, terrorism threathas no significant association with domestic counterterrorism policy support, even when using the liberal90% confidence level. This null condition comprises about half of the sample (scores of 0, 1, or 2 on theeffectiveness index). Only those that had scores of 3, 4, or 5 on the effectiveness index, also representingabout 50% of the sample, had positive statistically significant associations between terrorism threat andsupport for domestic counterterror policies. This pattern supports hypothesis four; terror threat would onlyassociate with support for counterterrorism policies when there was some reasonable prospect of that policyresolving the threat. This threshold is identified as believing that a majority of the domestic counterterrorismpolicies would effectively reduce terrorism. The overall positive effect of perceived terrorism threat incolumn one of Table 3 then is driven by just the half of respondents that consider these policies to begenerally effective tools to reduce terrorism in the United States. It seems that the attitudinal components(i.e., effectiveness index) of the supposed trade-off indeed have relevance for understanding the structure ofdomestic counterterrorism policy support and are not simply interesting antecedent attitudes with littlepractical import as is sometimes found in studies of privacy and surveillance.ConclusionPublic opinion scholarship commonly assumes that counterterrorism policy preferences are structured bythe security-liberty trade-off framework with policy attitudes formed by advantaging one value at theexpense of the other. Several European studies have offered strong evidence that ordinary individuals donot typically think in terms of a trade-off when considering counterterrorism policies (van der Brock 2017;Potoglou et al. 2010; Bellanova and Gonzalez-Fuster 2013). Despite this work probing the veracity of thetrade-off framework for understanding European attitudes, we still lack an overt examination about whetherUS attitudes conform to this trade-off framework. A focus on the trade-off thinking in the US is warrantedbecause privacy and surveillance attitudes can vary greatly by culture and context and because the UnitedStates’ approach to security often trickles over into the security arrangements of US allies.-0.4-0.200.20.40.60.810 Effective1 Effective2 Effective3 Effective4 Effective5 EffectiveMean Terrorism Threat Effect with 90% Confidence IntervalSupport for Domestic Counterterrorism Policy
Upload your study docs or become a
Course Hero member to access this document
Upload your study docs or become a
Course Hero member to access this document
End of preview. Want to read all 18 pages?
Upload your study docs or become a
Course Hero member to access this document