We dont necessarily think of all the regulatory steps he tells Newsweek Its

We dont necessarily think of all the regulatory steps

This preview shows page 93 - 95 out of 132 pages.

"We don't necessarily think of all the regulatory steps," he tells Newsweek. "It's taken a lot of spontaneity out of [research], but the potential risk to investigators warrants that." ¶  Mistakes such as the one made at Texas A&M are not new to science —pio neering nuclear scientists, for example, often subjected themselves to contamination in their labs, and Marie Curie, who won a Nobel Prize for her research into radioactivity, died from a bone marrow disease caused by years of radiation exposure. Bio-error can be as simple (and as human) as a scientist pricking herself with a needle that contains some infectious agent, or in some inadvertent way transferring a virus outside the lab. It can also mean an improperly shipped select agent —yes, they are  sometime s sent through the mail or simple ignorance of appropriate lab safety.
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1nc BioTerror D No impact---attacks will be small, no dispersion, and countermeasures solve Filippa Lentzos 14 , PhD from London School of Economics and Social Science, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King’s College London, Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London, DPhil from the University of Sussex, former senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, and Dr. Claire Marris, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King's College London, “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,” 9/18/2014, - synthetic-bioweapons7626 The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterror ism threat typically portray it as an imminent concern , with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks , performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions. The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non- proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is backed up by historical evidence . The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small- scale , low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction.
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