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Allowing others the same amount of liberty king

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allowing others the same amount of liberty” (King, Hobbes: The Social Contract) as this is good for every individual as well as the society. This logically can lead to the fact that “each person ought to abide by the agreement” so made (King, Hobbes: The Social Contract). Such peace, Hobbes argues, can be made by enforcing the social contract through a leviathan. The final fundamental law of nature: “I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or this assembly of man, on this condition, that you give up your right to him, and authorize all his actions in like matter”. As such natural rights are in place to preserve natural laws, they are only necessary in the circumstance that one is in the ruthless, vile State of Nature where all are in competition. This is unnecessary if all honestly bind themselves into this social contract. “Every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war” (Hobbes, §14.4), and such universal forfeit of natural rights is the way to avoid it. The leviathan’s role comes into play as it is able to maintain the keeping of the agreements, as otherwise, there will be the risk of certain people not giving up their rights endangering the lives of others in danger. The success of the entire notion depends on everyone keeping the agreement or otherwise there will not be maintenance the peace that maintains the optimal initial premise. The notion of punishment and reward would incentivize the maintenance of the contract (Hobbes, §28). However, would these covenants still be abided by in the State of Nature? Without direct reference to the contemporary game theory, Hobbes addresses similar ideas based on the
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decisions competitive humans must make while trying to preserve their own life. This can be articulated through the example of the prisoner’s dilemma, as it keeps agreements without the leviathan, through the very laws of the State of Nature. Within the strategy matrix, of the classic prisoner’s dilemma, the agreements are with the two individual criminals, not with the law. Upon being caught, there are four possible consequences to the combined decisions of the prisoners who chose simultaneously. As both have been partners in committing the crime, the optimal strategy for the two involved in the agreement would be not confess. If one confesses when the
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allowing others the same amount of liberty King Hobbes The...

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