slides-chap6A-communication-soft

Integraldisplay 1 a t t 2 dt slc a t t b 2 a t t b 2

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integraldisplay 1 0 ( a ( t ) t ) 2 dt s.l.c. ( a ( t ) t b ) 2 ≥ − ( a ( t ) t b ) 2 , t, t T. Clairement, si b negationslash = 0 , un engagement du d´ ecideur sur son point id´ eal, a ( t ) = t , ne v´ erifie pas la contrainte d’incitation
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable On montre (voir Melumad et Shibano, 1991) : si b 1 / 2 alors a ( t ) = 1 / 2 pour tout t , et si b 1 / 2 le contrat optimal a la forme suivante : 1 1 b b 1 2 b 1 a ( t ) a 1 ( t ) = t + b a 2 ( t ) = t
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable On v´ erifie ´ egalement EU D 1 EU E 1 EU 1 , EU E 2 EU D 2 EU 2 . La meilleure situation pour le d´ ecideur est l’engagement et pour l’expert, la el´ egation. Quel que soit l’´ equilibre consid´ er´ e, la communication de type “cheap talk” est la moins bonne pour les deux joueurs
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Plusieurs d´ ecideurs. Farrell et Gibbons (1989) montrent que la pr´ esence de deux d´ ecideurs (r´ ecepteurs) avec des pr´ ef´ erences (donc des r´ eactions ` a l’information) diff´ erentes peut augmenter la cr´ edibilit´ e de l’expert
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Plusieurs d´ ecideurs. Farrell et Gibbons (1989) montrent que la pr´ esence de deux d´ ecideurs (r´ ecepteurs) avec des pr´ ef´ erences (donc des r´ eactions ` a l’information) diff´ erentes peut augmenter la cr´ edibilit´ e de l’expert Exemple : Q R q 1 q 2 r 1 r 2 k 1 v 1 , x 1 0 , 0 w 1 , y 1 0 , 0 k 2 0 , 0 v 2 , x 2 0 , 0 w 2 , y 2
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Plusieurs d´ ecideurs. Farrell et Gibbons (1989) montrent que la pr´ esence de deux d´ ecideurs (r´ ecepteurs) avec des pr´ ef´ erences (donc des r´ eactions ` a l’information) diff´ erentes peut augmenter la cr´ edibilit´ e de l’expert Exemple : Q R q 1 q 2 r 1 r 2 k 1 v 1 , x 1 0 , 0 w 1 , y 1 0 , 0 k 2 0 , 0 v 2 , x 2 0 , 0 w 2 , y 2 Si, par exemple, v 1 = w 2 = 3 et v 2 = w 1 = 1 alors l’unique ´ equilibre est non r´ ev´ elateur en priv´ e, mais il existe un ´ equilibre compl` etement r´ ev´ elateur en public (“discipline mutuelle”)
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable ef´ erences Aumann, R. J. et S. Hart (2003) : “Long Cheap Talk,” Econometrica , 71, 1619–1660. Bolton, P. et M. Dewatripont (2005) : Contract Theory , MIT Press. Crawford, V. P. et J. Sobel (1982) : “Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica , 50, 1431–1451. Dessein, W. (2002) : “Authority and Communication in Organizations,” Review of Economic Studies , 69, 811–832. Farrell, J. et R. Gibbons (1989) : “Cheap Talk with Two Audiences,” American Economic Review , 79, 1214–1223. Farrell, J. et M. Rabin (1996) : “Cheap Talk,” Journal of Economic Perspectives , 10, 103–118.
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