From earlyintheWarI hadbeen impressedwith theideathatactive,andcontinuous operations of allthetroopsthat couldbe brought intothe field,regardlessofseasonand weather, were necessary to a speedy terminationof the giganticrebellionraging in the land. Theresources oftheenemy,andhis numericalstrength, was farinferiortoours. Butasan ofset[sic]to thiswehada vastterritory,with apopulation hostile to the government, togar-rison,and long lines of river andrail-road communication, trthrough terri-tory equallyhostile,toprotect to secure in order that the moreactiveArmiesmight be supplied.—WhilstEastern and Western Armies werefighting in-dependent battles, workingtogether likeabalkyteamwherenotwoeverpulledtogether,givingSummers andWinters toalmostentireinactivity, thusenabling theenemy to use togreat advantagehis his- interiorlinesof com-munication fortransportingportion of hisArmies fromone theatre of Wartoanother, and tofurloughlargenumbers of theArmyiesduringthese sea-sons of inactivity to go totheirhome and do theworkof producing for thesuport of these Armies, itwas a questionwhetherournumericalstrengthwas notmore than balancedbythese[dis]advantages.Myopinion wasfirmlyfixedlong beforethehonor of commanding allour Armies had beenconferedonmethat nopeace could behadthat wouldbestable,orconduciveto thehappinessof North or South, untiltheMilitarypowerofthe rebellionwasentirely broken.Believingusto be onepeople,Source:JohnY.Simon, ed.,ThePapers of Ulysses S. Grant(Carbondale: Southern IllinoisUniversityPress, 1988),XV:pp. 164-166.