不完美替代品的 纳 什均�是什么 图 814 T OR F 如果产品是不完美的替代品那么企业 1 的 需求 函数 将 不 仅 取决

不完美替代品的 纳 什均?是什么 图 814 t

This preview shows page 58 - 62 out of 109 pages.

不完美替代品的什均衡是什么? (8.14。)T OR F.如果产品是不完美的替代品,那么企业1需求函数取决于其价格,还取决于价格企业2的收费(相互依赖性)。 什均衡价格同时足两个价格函数
Background image
102. Please explain the Bertrand equilibrium with product differentiation(Figure 8.16.). PointB is the Nash equilibrium to Bertrand game, where thetwo price best-responsefunctions are both satisfied. Firm cannot undercut their rival and capture the entiremarket. The result is a reduced price competition and both firms exercise marketpower in equilibrium. Prices are lower than in monopolistic situation (Point M). Themarket power of Betrand duoplists depends on the elasticity of demand. 解释Bertrand与产品差异的平衡(8.16。)。BBertrand博弈Nash均衡,其中两个价格最函数都得到满足。 公司不能削弱们的竞争对个市场。 结果是价格竞争少,两家公司均衡市场力量。 价格低于垄断情况(M点)。Betrand duoplists的市场力量取决于需求的弹性。
Background image
103. How do capacity constraints affect the Bertrand game? Please interpretFigure 8.18.When capacity is small, the equilibrium to capacity-constrained price game is for eachfirm to charge theprice that equates demand to capacity. When capacities arelarge,the equilibrium involves mixed-strategy equilibrium withprices greater than marginalcost. When capacities arevery large, then the equilibrium strategies are for the firmsto price at marginal cost. 量限如何影响Bertrand游戏解释8.18量较小时,对约束的价格博弈的均衡是个公司收等于需求产能的价格。 当能力很大时,均衡涉及策略均衡,价格高于边际本。 当能力非大时,均衡策略是企业以边际本定价。Case 1 when capacities are constrained. At the Nash equiblirium price,demand justequals the combined capacities of the two firm and they produce and sell to capacity.
Background image
Case 2 when capacities arenot constrained. The equilibrium price is for both firms tosetprice equal tomarginal cost, as firms have sufficient capacity.Case 3: Pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist, asat least one of the two firms willbe able to unilaterally deviate and increase its profits mixed-strategy. 情况1量受限时。 在Nash equiblirium价格下,需求等于两家公司的产能,们生产和销售产能。情况2,当量不受约束时。 均衡价格是两家公司价格设定为边际本,因为公司有足的产能。案例3:不存在策略均衡,因为两家公司中少有一家能够单方面离并加其利润策略。104. Please contrast the Cournot andBertrand cases. Which one is
Background image
Image of page 62

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture