between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles

Between owners of puvs and transport terminals and

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between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties . Admittedly, any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many people. However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of election campaign materials. Summary
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Atty. Faizah Tejero ELECTION LAWS From the joint efforts of 2 nd Year 4 year Program 2018 Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. On a final note, it bears str essing that the freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life. Bengson III V HRET and Teodoro Cruz Case Digest by: Nor-Aiza R. Unas Facts: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads: Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: x x x (4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
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