And hn commanders should prepare for a long term

and HN commanders should prepare for a long-term effort. All opera-
tions require unity of effort by civil authorities, intelligence agencies, and
security forces. Coherent IO are also needed.
5 - 54 . Clear-hold-build operations should expand outward from a secure
base. An example is an urban industrial complex whose population sup-
ports the government effort and where security forces are in firm control.
No population subjected to the intense organizational efforts of an insur-
gent organization can be won back until certain conditions are created:
The counterinsurgent forces are clearly superior to forces available to the in-
surgents.
Enough nonmilitary resources are available to effectively carry out all essential
improvements needed to provide basic services and control the population.
The insurgents are cleared from the area.
The insurgent organizational infrastructure and its support have been neutral-
ized or eliminated.
A HN government presence is established to replace the insurgents’ presence,
and the local populace willingly supports this HN presence.
5 - 55 . The following discussion describes some examples of activities in-
volved in the clear-hold-build approach. Its execution involves activities
across all LLOs. There can be overlap between steps—especially between
hold and build, where relevant activities are often conducted simultane-
ously.
clearing the area
5 - 56 . Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to re-
move all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned

176
chapter five
area (FM 3 - 90 ). The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing
the withdrawal of insurgent combatants. This task is most effectively initi-
ated by a clear-in-zone or cordon-and-search operation. This operation’s
purpose is to disrupt insurgent forces and force a reaction by major insur-
gent elements in the area. Commanders employ a combination of offen-
sive small-unit operations. These may include area saturation patrolling
that enables the force to defeat insurgents in the area, interdiction am-
bushes, and targeted raids.
5 - 57 . These offensive operations are only the beginning, not the end state.
Eliminating insurgent forces does not remove the entrenched insurgent
infrastructure. While their infrastructure exists, insurgents continue to re-
cruit among the population, attempt to undermine the HN government,
and try to coerce the populace through intimidation and violence. Af-
ter insurgent forces have been eliminated, removing the insurgent infras-
tructure begins. This should be done so as to minimize the impact on the
local populace. Rooting out such infrastructure is essentially a police ac-
tion that relies heavily on military and intelligence forces until HN police,
courts, and legal processes can assume responsibility for law enforcement
within the cleared area.