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action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, orprejudice.The above disquisitions ineluctably show the absence of said elements in this case.In the instant case, there is no showing at all that private respondent tried to ascertain the ownership of Mang Uro Store and the extent of theauthority of the applicants to represent Lauro Cruz at any time before it approved the credit application card.There is as well no evidence, much less any claim by private respondent, that before Me Cruz and Marilou Cruz signed the credit application card, ithad been dealing with petitioner or the Mang Uro Store, or that for sometime prior thereto, petitioner ever represented to it as the owner of thestore that he has authorized the above signatories to represent him in any transaction. Clearly, it was error for the respondent Court to concludethat petitioner should be held liable to private respondent on account of the credit application card on the theory that he permitted the carrying of27
the business of the store. This theory further erroneously assumes that the business of the store before the filing of the credit application cardincluded the sale of products of private respondent. There is evidence on this appoint.Moreover, it is apparent that the purpose of the request of private respondent to file an amended complaint within ten (10) days from 27 March1984, the date when the pre-trial was held, which the trial court granted, 28was precisely to implead the signatories to the credit application card.This was precisely prompted by the insistence of petitioner that he is not liable for the claims in the complaint because he did not sign the creditcard application and the invoices. In short, he is erroneously impleaded as defendant. Since among the matters to be considered at pre-trial is thenecessity or desirability of amendments to pleadings, 29the request was seasonably and properly made.Private respondent did not amend the complaint within the period aforesaid. So, when the case was caned for heating on 16 May 1984, pursuant tothe Order of 27 March 1984, and the parties did not appear, the trial court should have dismissed the case for failure on the part of privaterespondent to file the amended complaint. Such dismissal is authorized under Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. The respondent Court,however, brushed aside this point by holding that the non-compliance by private respondent "was muted by the subsequent order dated May 16,1984 which submitted the case for decision;" and that by said order "the trial court appears to have given its assent to resolving the case on thebasis of the unamended complaint," which is authorized by Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Although this justification is flimsy and begsthe question, the foregoing resolution on the issue of petitioner's liability to the private respondent renders unnecessary further discussion on the