followingelementsofthecrimemustbeprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt:(1) That on or about the 28th day of July, 2010, the defendantdid knowingly initiate, organize,plan,finance,direct,manageorsupervise the theft of a motor vehicle forsaleto others;(2) That the defendant did knowingly traffic in stolen property;and(3) That any oftheseacts occurred in Snohomish County.
No.67867-1-1/7conviction.Owens'sfirstdegreetrafficking in stolen property convictionmustbereversed.b.PossessionofaStolenVehicleTo convictOwensofpossessionof a stolen vehicle,theStatehadto provebeyond areasonabledoubtthatheknowinglypossesseda stolen motor vehicleandthatheknewthevehiclewasstolen.12OwenscontendsthattheStatefailedto present sufficientevidence of the "knowledge" element.13Possessionof stolen property alonedoesnotcreatea presumption that thepersonknewthepropertywasstolen,butthatfact,togetherwith"slightcorroborativeevidenceofotherinculpatory circumstances tending toshowguilt"willsupport a conviction.14Examples of such corroborative evidence include theabsence of a plausible explanation andflight.1512RCW9A.56.068(1), .140(1).RCW9A.56.068(1) states that"[a]person isguiltyof possession of a stolen vehicleifhe orshepossess[possesses]a stolen motorvehicle."RCW 9A.56.140(1) definespossessionof stolen property in partas"knowingly"receiving, retaining, possessing, concealing, or disposing of stolenproperty"knowingthatit hasbeenstolen."Thejury wasinstructedthat"[possessing a stolen motor vehicle means knowingly to receive, retain, possess,conceal, or dispose of a stolen motor vehicle knowing that ithasbeen stolen andto withhold or appropriate thesameto the use of any person other than the trueownerorpersonentitled thereto."13Owens also claims therewasinsufficient evidence of the "knowledge" elementto support his first degree trafficking in stolen property conviction.Because wereversethatconviction, wedonotaddressthisissue,nor do weaddresshis claimthat the "to convict" instruction for firstdegreetrafficking in stolen property relievedtheStateoftheburdento prove knowledge.14State v.Ford. 33 Wn.App.788, 790, 658 P.2d 36 (1983).is gee,e^,Statev.Hudson. 56Wn.App.490, 495, 784 P.2d 533(1990)("[t]heabsence of any explanation for [the defendant's] use of what appears to have
No.67867-1-1/8Here, viewingtheevidence inthelight most favorable totheStateanddrawing allreasonableinferences therefrom,theevidencewassufficient to sustaintheconviction.TheBeetlewasstolenlessthan24hoursafterOwenstest-droveit.A fewdaysafterthetheft,Owensregisteredthetitle to a 1971 Volkswagen.Roughlythreeweekslater,Owenssoldthestolen 1967 Beetle toSauvageau.Owensmisrepresented toSauvageauthatthecarwasactually a 1971 Beetle,despitethefactthatOwensworked on Volkswagens for aliving,wasextremelyknowledgeableaboutVolkswagens,andevenhad a Volkswagen tattoo stretchingacrosshis back.OwenstoldSauvageauhe had "lost"thetitle.TheBeetleOwenssoldtoSauvageauhadafakeVINplatethatcorrespondedtothe1971