One was, General MacArthur felt that air power alone could force a Japanese surrender
within six months with little risk to American lives. However, it was also argued that this may be
a best case scenario where in actuality it could take substantially longer.
24
The second alternative
option was to allow the Japanese to retain the Emperor - This plan was predicated on mitigating
the call for unconditional surrender by Japan. Both Secretary of War Stimson and Acting
Secretary of State Grew felt that this was an essential policy because of the dedication and
fanaticism of the Japanese people towards the Emperor Hirohito, whom the Japanese believed to
be a deity.
25
The final option that was discussed was waiting on the Soviet Union to enter the war.
This was President Roosevelt’s primary objective, they Committee believed that a Soviet
invasion of Manchuria would be helpful but not decisive by itself.
26
Feis, also discussed the
alternative options to bombing both cities given out by the Interim Committee, with each of these
option produced more questions.
27
Including the most important, would it end the war sooner?
This event will always have controversy surrounding it. Historians will always try to
answer the questions of whether the United States government was justified in dropping the
24
Donohue, Nathan. “Understanding the Decision to Drop the Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” CSIS.
Last modified August 10, 2012. Accessed, January 23, 2015. understanding-decision-
drop-bomb-hiroshima-and-nagasaki.
25
Ibid.
26
Donohue, Nathan. “Understanding the Decision to Drop the Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” CSIS.
Last modified August 10, 2012. Accessed, January 23, 2015. understanding-decision-
drop-bomb-hiroshima-and-nagasaki.
27
Feis, Herbert. "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II." Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1966.
11 |
P a g e
bombs. There will also always be controversy on how close Japan was to surrendering before the
bombing of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Some historians like Miscamble will believe that
there was no reason to believe that Japan was close to surrender before to the bombing. While
others like Bird and Sherwin will believe the bombings were both unnecessary. The only thing
that we, as historians, can do now is make sure that we continue to talk about both sides, so that
if this situation ever arises again in the future we can look at the past to make a very educational
decision as a country.
Work Cited:
Bird, Kia, and Martin Sherwin. "The Myths of Hiroshima." Los Angeles Times. August 5,
2005. Accessed February 25, 2015. .
Donohue, Nathan. “Understanding the Decision to Drop the Bomb on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki,” CSIS. Last modified August 10, 2012. Accessed, January 23, 2015.
