There was no denying that the following war would

end the war in the fall of 1946 (222). There was no denying that the following war would bring
great loss to the United States, considering his predictions. In terms of reasons, according to the
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, “The Japanses are highly patriotic and certainly susceptible to
calls for fanatical resistance to repel an invasion (168),” and the terrain was hard to land and to

Cui, Jing
operate tanks (168). Clearly, the reasons why Japan was hard to attack lay in three aspects: the
United States was distant from Japan, the army had difficulties in landing large advanced
weapons, such as tanks, owing to Japanese terrain, and Japanese would defend their territory
regardless of the costs. If the land war virtually happened, the army of the United States would
have fought, with less advanced weapons, against the manic Japanese army in their most familiar
places exhausted after long travel. There was no promise who would be the winner.
Secondly, the United States would be able to take over the Japanese affairs in Manchuria
before Soviet Union interfering. Manchuria was politically important to the United States,
proved by the president. According to the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, President Truman
“was most anxious to get the Japanese affairs over with before the Russian got in, with particular
reference to Dairen and Port Arthur (217).” Byrnes also said that Truman made up his mind to
get charge of Manchuria knowing that Roosevelt had made an agreement, in which the affairs
were given to Russia, with Stalin on Manchuria (245). The location of Manchuria was so
significant geographically that Truman deliberately defaulted the agreement with Stalin. In fact,
it was commonly true that, besides the United States, several powers were intended to take