The plaintiff intended to insist on the distinction between pay by the day and

The plaintiff intended to insist on the distinction

  • University of Texas
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The plaintiff intended to insist on the distinction between pay by the day and pay by the week, in that the latter afforded him compensation for work which would not in fact be required, when in any week a school day came upon a holiday. There was no meeting of minds, and hence no contract. Judgment affirmed . Hamer v. Sidway (what is considered consideration) William E. Story, Sr., promised to pay his nephew, William E. Story, II, $5,000 if he would refrain from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he became twenty-one years of age. The uncle died, without having made payment
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The trial court ruled that the uncle's promise to pay the $5,000 was not supported by consideration on the part of the nephew (the promisee) and entered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. Hamer asserts that the promisee, by refraining from the use of liquor and tobacco, was not harmed, but benefited and unless the promisor was benefited, the contract was without consideration. However, it is sufficient that he restricted his lawful freedom of action within certain prescribed limits upon the faith of his uncle's agreement, and now, having fully performed the conditions imposed, it is of no moment whether such performance actually proved a benefit to the promisor, and the court will not inquire into it. Judgment reversed for the nephew. Quarture v. Alegheny County (can’t get more money for something you’ve already committed to) A written contract was entered into, under the terms of which lawyer Sniderman was to "institute, conduct, superintend or prosecute to final determination, if necessary, a suit or suits, action or claim against the County of Allegheny on account of taking, injuring, and affecting (my, our) property in the relocation, widening, and opening of the State Highway known as Route No. 545." The contract further provided that Sniderman was to receive, as a fee for his services, "10 percent of all that might be recovered." After first trial, plaintiff was dissatisfied and appealed. For this appeal, he and Sniderman entered a new contract stating that Quarture would pay him a fee of 33 percent of whatever recovery might be obtained on appeal. Quarture objected, contending that his promise to pay the larger percentage was not supported by consideration and that Sniderman was thus bound by his original contract. The court rejected Reversed because agreement did not stipulate additional compensation in case of an appeal Sarvis v. Vermont State Colleges (fraudulent misrepresentation) P fired from teaching job bc he fraudulently misrepresented his work history (had been in prison) D wins, can rescind K on basis of Ps express fraudulent misrepresentation by failure to disclose information (and/or affirmative assertion) Stambovsky v. Ackley (Silence = fraud if there is a duty to speak) Brief Fact Summary: The Plaintiff, Stambovsky (Plaintiff), brought suit to rescind
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