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Hereafter the term flogicalg will be used to isolate

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Hereafter, the term flogicalg will be used to isolate a sense of frationalg correlating to the reasoned linearity that ideally occurs in dialectical argumentation. This term is not meant to suggest that the arguments so-called are deductively correct or even intended to model deductive arguments. Rather, it is intended to indicate not merely a respect for orderliness of presentation, but also a subscription to a certain set of beliefs about evidence and sources of information. Arguments, as Toulmin (1958) pointed out, include not only claims and reasons, but evidence and principles of reasoning as well. In expanding the concept of argument beyond the logical we need to include modes of evidence, warrant, backing and presentation that allow us to identify forms of argument that are actually used as opposed to those that one particular group believes ought be used. In thereby separating the normative and descriptive elements of logicality we cease to condemn when we should be describing. Naturally, there are many who argue in favour of argument being exclusively rational in the above sense, and it is only fair these arguments be met. I will not, however, undertake that project in this essay. The defense of linear rational process has a long history beginning with Plato and continuing through Popper to the present day. Recent \attacks] mounted by Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty and others has opened many issues and left many questions unanswered. I leave these issues and answers to others, and instead seek to determine what happens, specifically in argumentation theory, when the basal assumptions of linear rationality as the icon of argument are loosened. I suggest that arguments can be categorized, in whole or part, by not one, but four distinct identifiable modes. These modes are, in addition to the 1] logical (in the sense described above,) 2] the emotional, which relates to the realm of feelings, 3] the visceral, which stems from the area of the physical, and 4] the kisceral (from the Japanese term ki meaning energy,) which covers the intuitive and non-sensory arenas. 3 I choose these four categories because argumentation is a sub-species of the more general category of human communication. When people communicate they use, both naturally and consciously, all the tools available to them (Willard, p. 8, 1989). These four categories provide a taxonomy that enables the argumentation scholar to classify according to the mode of communication relied upon most heavily. At its most extreme this view holds that arguments may be given (almost) wholly within one mode and not be at all susceptible to those methods of argument analysis pertaining to other modes. On this interpretation of the view a kiss, a look, a touch, a feeling, may be an argument provided it is communicated in a dissensual interaction. A more cautious statement emphasizes the (perhaps realistic) integration of these modes within most communications and uses D. O'Keefe's (1982) terminology, wherein an argument 1 is an item offered by an individual arguer within the context
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