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Not only is Chen Shui-Bian indicating that he wants a peaceful solution, the PRC’s Hu Jintao also appealed directly to the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, asking him to intervene. The United Nations Security Council agreed to immediately address the crisis. Hu Jintao's attempt to reach out for help, despite the checkered past with the United Nations is a giant step towards a peaceful resolution and now a world authority is involved. I assess that with the United Nations involved, the actions of the PRC will not be so bold and there is a more likelychance of this conflict ending in a political resolution. Even though the attempt has been made by both the PRC and Taiwan to settle matters in a peaceful resolution, the PRC still continues to mobilize their military up to 20 days prior to the election. This leads me to assess that the limitedintervention is still a likely scenario, albeit the least likely to occur (People’s Republic 2019).IV: Least likely to Occur: Limited InterventionGiven that most of the evidence provided in the direct attack hypothesis could also be used as evidence towards a limited intervention hypothesis, this scenario was a difficult decision to rank. After careful review and reevaluation of the existing evidence, I have decided to rank this scenario as the third most like with a 75 percent chance of occurring. In the limited intervention scenario, I assess that the PRC will utilize their political standings as well as their military force in efforts to dissuade the Taiwanese people from voting for a candidate that does not align with PRC objectives and goals, as well as crush any attempt from the Taiwan president,
current or elected, to gain independence. The PRC has a long history of crushing any attempt of independence and has publicly stated that the PRC will utilize non-peaceful methods to crush theattempt. Due to the fact that the United Nations is now involved in the situation, I assess that thiswill help keep the PRC from launching a direct attack, but not from intimidating Taiwan, which is why even though the limited intervention hypothesis ranks third, I still assess there is a fairly high chance of limited intervention happening. 75 days prior to the election, a Taiwan news media reports that Taiwan’s national security bureau has uncovered plans by the PRC to increase tensions between the PRC if Shu Chin-Chiang is elected. This would make sense due to the fact that Shu Chin-Chian’s campaign makes veiled references towards Taiwan independence, although Shu Chin-Chian never actually uses the word independence. A few days later, Shu Chin-Chian accuses Ma Ying Jeon for conspiring with the PRC to influence the elections. Ma Ying Jeon and the PRC both deny the allegations and PRC news media begins reporting that ShuChin-Chiang’s claims were baseless lies designed to increase tensions between the PRC and Taiwan. I assess that the PRC is utilizing subtle hints and warnings to influence the election. The PRC is utilizing a limited intervention in the political realm at this point, however, these minor political intrusions soon turn into large scale military scare tactics a few days later (People’s Republic 2019).