Room mates cleaning the house Each most prefers that everyone else cleans but

Room mates cleaning the house each most prefers that

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Room-mates cleaning the house Each most prefers that everyone else cleans but she does not Best for each Next, each prefers she cleans and everyone else cleans Best for all Next, each prefers that she does not clean and that everyone else does not The equilibrium outcome - tragic Each least prefers that she cleans and everyone else does not Total loser Conservation of commons Overfishing International arms race Obeying just laws and having a government 53 Social Dilemma Games Can be resolved by Moral, Social, Legal Regulation, or Combinations thereof Regulation changes it to a different game 54 Humans Don’t Do What Homo Economicus Predicts Experimental testing of anonymous one-round social dilemma games Prediction: zero cooperation Reality: about half of subjects cooperate Logical inference: Thus, humans in these experiments must be motivated by something additional to dollar payoffs Do lots of experiments to discover those other motivations 55 “Altruistic Punishment” In a repeated, anonymous, no-communication social dilemma cooperation declines in each round Economist Binmore: because they’ve learned how to play the game No. Reshuffle players for another 10 rounds, and cooperation again starts out high. Why? Why does cooperation decline with repetition? Repeated social dilemma with second-party punishment option yields high cooperation 56
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11/4/19 15 Strong Reciprocity In repeated, anonymous, two-person games, cooperation is initially observed to be reciprocated with cooperation, Independently of the dollar payoffs, i.e., contrary to the rational choice of always defect based on the dollar payoffs alone Further, third parties observing the games of others will, at cost to themselves, reward cooperators and punish defectors Doing so helps unknown strangers and the subject takes home less money than she would otherwise 57 Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments B = std. social dilemma; R = punishment; FF = face to face communication; FFwr = face to face & punishment Olivier Bochet, Talbot Page, Louis Putterman 58 Communication vs. Punishment Communication is more effective than punishment B&G are mistaken, communication is not symbolic punishment, rather punishment is a crude and clumsy form of communication Praise and rebuke motivate; reward is a form of praise and punishment a form of rebuke. 59 Behavioral Evidence vs. Homo Economicus Weak moral motivations contrary to homo economicus (dictator game) Strong reciprocity motivations contrary to homo economicus Help those who help; harm those who harm Conditional cooperation: cooperate if and only if others do (ultimatum, social dilemma games) 60
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11/4/19 16 Evaluation of Strong Reciprocity Evidence Third party punishment and reward by individuals strongly established in repeated laboratory experiments (Fehr) Objection: third-party punishment by an individual is rarely observed in ethnographic studies or in life (Guala) Bowles and Gintis reply:
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