ECONOMICS
slides-chap6A-communication-soft

# P 1 2 par exemple σ k 1 3 4 a 1 4 b σ k 2 1 4 a 3 4

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p = 1 / 2 (par exemple) : σ ( k 1 ) = 3 4 a + 1 4 b σ ( k 2 ) = 1 4 a + 3 4 b Pr( k 1 | a ) = Pr( a | k 1 ) Pr( k 1 ) Pr( a ) = 3 / 4 Pr( k 1 | b ) = Pr( b | k 1 ) Pr( k 1 ) Pr( a ) = 1 / 4

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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable ´ Equilibre partiellement r´ ev´ elateur lorsque p = 1 / 2 (par exemple) : σ ( k 1 ) = 3 4 a + 1 4 b σ ( k 2 ) = 1 4 a + 3 4 b Pr( k 1 | a ) = Pr( a | k 1 ) Pr( k 1 ) Pr( a ) = 3 / 4 Pr( k 1 | b ) = Pr( b | k 1 ) Pr( k 1 ) Pr( a ) = 1 / 4 braceleftBigg τ ( a ) = j 2 τ ( b ) = j 4
Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable ´ Equilibre partiellement r´ ev´ elateur lorsque p = 1 / 2 (par exemple) : σ ( k 1 ) = 3 4 a + 1 4 b σ ( k 2 ) = 1 4 a + 3 4 b Pr( k 1 | a ) = Pr( a | k 1 ) Pr( k 1 ) Pr( a ) = 3 / 4 Pr( k 1 | b ) = Pr( b | k 1 ) Pr( k 1 ) Pr( a ) = 1 / 4 braceleftBigg τ ( a ) = j 2 τ ( b ) = j 4 ´ equilibre, utilit´ e esp´ er´ ee = 3 4 (3 , 8) + 1 4 (3 , 0) = (3 , 6) (meilleur pour l’´ emetteur que l’EN non r´ ev´ elateur et l’EN compl` etement r´ ev´ elateur)

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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Probl` eme de d´ ecision de base Deux joueurs Joueur 1 = ´ emetteur, expert (sans action) Joueur 2 = ecepteur, d´ ecideur (sans information)
Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Probl` eme de d´ ecision de base Deux joueurs Joueur 1 = ´ emetteur, expert (sans action) Joueur 2 = ecepteur, d´ ecideur (sans information) Deux types possibles pour l’expert (se g´ en´ eralise facilement) : K = { k 1 , k 2 } = { 1 , 2 } , Pr( k 1 ) = p , Pr( k 2 ) = 1 p

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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Probl` eme de d´ ecision de base Deux joueurs Joueur 1 = ´ emetteur, expert (sans action) Joueur 2 = ecepteur, d´ ecideur (sans information) Deux types possibles pour l’expert (se g´ en´ eralise facilement) : K = { k 1 , k 2 } = { 1 , 2 } , Pr( k 1 ) = p , Pr( k 2 ) = 1 p Actions possibles du r´ ecepteur : j J
Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Probl` eme de d´ ecision de base Deux joueurs Joueur 1 = ´ emetteur, expert (sans action) Joueur 2 = ecepteur, d´ ecideur (sans information) Deux types possibles pour l’expert (se g´ en´ eralise facilement) : K = { k 1 , k 2 } = { 1 , 2 } , Pr( k 1 ) = p , Pr( k 2 ) = 1 p Actions possibles du r´ ecepteur : j J Paiements : A k ( j ) et B k ( j )

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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Jeu silencieux (“silent game”) Γ( p ) p 1 · · · j · · · k 1 A 1 (1) , B 1 (1) · · · A 1 ( j ) , B 1 ( j ) · · · 1 p 1 · · · j · · · k 2 A 2 (1) , B 2 (1) · · · A 2 ( j ) , B 2 ( j ) · · ·
Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Strat´ egie mixte du r´ ecepteur y Δ( J ) paiements esp´ er´ es A k ( y ) = summationdisplay j J y ( j ) A k ( j ) B k ( y ) = summationdisplay j J y ( j ) B k ( j )

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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Strat´ egie mixte du r´ ecepteur y Δ( J )
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• Spring '10
• breviart
• Game Theory, Transmission strat´gique

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